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Exploring relations between environmental
regulation and competitiveness: Literature
Review
Abstract
This article oﬀers a critical review of the large empirical literature on the Porter Hypothesis
(PH). The empirical studies usually investigated the “weak” and the “strong” version of the PH
in isolation, not verifying explicitly a channel through which environmental regulation aﬀects
economic performance and competitiveness. Furthermore, the issue complicating empirical in-
vestigation of the Porter Hypothesis is measurement of environmental regulation, simultaneity
between environmental regulation, innovation and competitiveness, as well as unobserved het-
erogeneity that could bias estimated eﬀect of environmental regulation. With the exception of
several recent papers, this issue left unexplored in the literature.
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1 Introduction
This paper summarises theoretical and empirical studies investigating relations between
environmental regulation and competitiveness. The level and stringency of environmental
regulation has continued to increase steadily worldwide since the early 1970s as environ-
mental quality has assumed growing importance on both the political and public agenda.
The issue therefore has become a very hot topic in the recent environmental literature.
In light of considerable enforcement of environmental policies in the last decades, the
gross costs associated with meeting environmental regulation are very high and of grow-
ing concern. Many worry that environmental regulation will place an excessive burden
on industrial enterprises, thereby stifling growth and damaging their competitiveness in
an increasingly global market place.
There are two main views on an eﬀect generated by environmental regulation on
comparative advantages. One view is that environmental regulation raises the costs to
firms and imposes constraints on industrial behaviour, hence aﬀecting competitiveness
adversely. Environmental regulation forces firms to invest in R&D in cleaner technol-
ogy. Consequently it displaces R&D expenditure in other more profitable areas such
as the firm’s core business, given that firm’s investment budgets are limited (Gray and
Shadbegian, 1993).
An alternative view, known as The Porter Hypothesis (hereafter PH, Porter, 1991;
Porter and Van der Linde, 1995), challenges the negative impact of environmental reg-
ulation and argues that well-established environmental policy could benefit both the
environment and the firm, by making it realise otherwise neglected investment opportu-
nities. According to the PH, stringent environmental policy could result in a “win-win”
situation of better environmental quality and higher firms‘ productivity. The firms, faced
with higher abatement costs, would invest in innovation activities to find new ways to
meet new regulatory requirements: the resulting production processes and product spec-
ification would reduce pollution and, at the same time, lower production costs or increase
product market value.
Environmental regulation could stimulate the firm faced with market imperfections,
such as imperfect information, organisational inertia or control problems, to introduce
innovation, that, in turn, helps to increase resource eﬃciency and enhance productivity.
Compliance costs could be consequently oﬀset, and the firm would get a competitive
advantage in the foreign countries, not subject to similar regulation.
Initially formulated in rather general terms, the PH can be declined as three possible
and distinct research statements (Jaﬀe and Palmer, 1997). First, the “narrow” version of
the PH postulates that flexible environmental regulation, such as market-based instru-
ments, increases firmsncentives to innovate compared to prescriptive regulation, such as
performance-based or technology-based standards. Second, the “weak” version of the PH
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postulates the positive eﬀect of well-crafted environmental regulations on environmental
innovations (even when environmental innovation comes at an opportunity cost that ex-
ceeds its benefits for a firm). Finally, the “strong” PH states that innovation induced by
well-crafted environmental regulation could more than oﬀset additional regulatory costs,
and, consequently, increase firm competitiveness and productivity.
The objective of this paper is to bring together two detached research lines, namely
“weak” and“strong” PH, and summarize theoretical and empirical evidence on the relation
between environmental regulation and competitiveness. We illustrate several potential
problems and biases that arise when the relations are investigated in isolation. We dis-
cuss diﬀerent environmental policy indicators commonly used in the literature and their
shortcomings. Furthermore, we identify potential gaps for further research. The paper
proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the theoretical literature on the PH.
Section 3 discusses diﬀerent components of competitiveness relevant for empirical inves-
tigation of the PH and overview empirical papers investigating impact of environmental
regulation on each indicator in turn. Section 4 summarises various environmental reg-
ulation indicators commonly used in the literature. Finally, Section 5 discuss potential
identification problems arising in the econometric investigation of the PH.
2 Theoretical literature
Porter, 1991 and Porter and van der Linde, 1995 provide anecdotical evidence based
on the case studies that “innovations oﬀsets on environmental regulation are common”
(Porter and van der Linde 1995). The idea was later formalised in the firm-level theo-
retical models, that can be broadly divided into two types: the inter-firms models where
environmental regulation could be beneficial for firms, correcting for market failure (Xepa-
padeas et al.,1999; Simpson and Bradford, 1996; Alpay, 2001) and the intra-firm models
obtaining results in the context of organizational failure (Andre et al., 2009).
The inter-firms models assume the existence of a market failure1 under which environ-
mental regulation could improve both firms performance and environmental quality. In
this vein, Xepapadeas et al.,1999 suggest a theoretical model that looks at firms‘ reaction
with respect to both the type and the quantity of equipment in which they invest in re-
sponse to changes in the production costs due to environmental tax increase. They found
that environmental tax increase reduces the total capital stock (so-called “downsizing
eﬀect”). Under special condition on parameters the “downsizing” of the firm also causes
modernization of capital stock (a decrease in the average age of capital stock), which, in
turn, increases the average productivity of the firm. They conclude that under assump-
1 Market failure happens when the allocation of goods and services by a free market is not eﬃcient.
That is, there exists another conceivable outcome where a market participant may be made better-oﬀ
without making someone else worse-oﬀ.
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tion of some functional form for a relatively narrow sub-set of parameter values when the
downsizing of the home industry due to a stricter environmental policy is accompanied by
modernization of its capital stock, there are smaller losses in profits and there are greater
gains in emission reductions relative to the case where modernization is not possible
(Xepapadeas et al.1999). However, their results suggest that even when environmental
regulation mitigates the conflict between environmental quality and competitiveness, it
would not be likely to yield a “win-win” situation.
Simpson and Bradford, 1996 evaluate Porter argument in a strategic trade model,
with the domestic and foreign firms producing perfectly substitutable goods and the
domestic government introducing the eﬄuent tax. Diﬀerently from the other authors
they introduce in the model R&D spillovers, reflecting that a firm may be unable fully to
appropriate all gains accruing to its own innovative activity as R&D expenditure could
reduce not only its own cost, but also the rival’s cost. It comes out from the model that
innovation spillovers are likely to be an important consideration in analysing the eﬀects
of eﬄuent taxes on domestic R&D, and, consequently, on domestic firm profits as it
decrease the domestic firm‘s innovation oﬀset eﬀect. The authors conclude that domestic
eﬄuent tax hinges on its net eﬀect on foreign cost-reducing investment, a factor the
domestic authorities cannot regulate directly and may find diﬃcult even to predict with
any confidence (Simpson and Bradford 1996).To summarize, the authors are skeptical
about the Porter results saying that “..it may be a theoretical possibility, but that it is
extremely dubious as practical advice” (Simpson and Bradford 1996).
In an open economy model with two countries, each accommodating two Cournot-
oligopolists producing a good, Alpay, 2001 investigates how tradable emission permits
aﬀect international competitiveness. The paper develops the mechanism where due to
change in tradable emission permit’s prices and price elasticity of demand environmen-
tal regulation makes some non-feasible R&D projects profitable, consequently enhancing
international competitiveness of the firm. Higher environmental standards at home in-
crease demand for domestic production and open up a new channel towards increased
competitiveness (Alpay, 2001). Conditional on parameters the results are in accordance
with the Porter hypothesis.
Similar idea stemming from consumer preferences, is suggested in the paper of Andre
et al., 2009. In a strategic duopoly model under imperfect competition and diﬀeren-
tiated products, environmental policy solves firms coordination failure problem. In an
unregulated case the game could result in a classical prisoner dilemma, where both firms
produce a standard variant of the good, but stand to benefit from a joint decision to
produce a more environmentally friendly variant. They show that consumer preferences,
rather than any productivity gain or cost savings brought about by regulation may favour
creation of a regulated environment, in which firms stand to benefit from sales of higher
quality products at higher prices. Consumers are often willing to pay more for a cleaner
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product, but the firm adopting a new technology to produce the cleaner product under
the unregulated market potentially expose it to the opportunistic behavior of its competi-
tors (which could then go on to market the cheaper, low quality good at a lower price,
thereby capturing a large share of the market). Diﬀerently, under the regulated mar-
ket an innovative firm will benefit as also competitors are forced to produce the “green”
products, it reduces price elasticity of demand and there is no risk of price disadvantage.
In a stylized model of intra-firm renegotiation between a firm owner, a manager and an
environmental regulator, Ambec and Barla, 2002 address the issue of environmental policy
correcting organisational failure. The paper suggests the mechanism where regulation
creates external pressure to overcome organizational inertia. The managers in the model
have private information about an outcome of R&D investments. In order to favour
revelation by the agents, the shareholders must oﬀer informational rent when a successful
R&D program is reported. As this rent is a cost for the shareholder, it lowers incentives to
invest in R&D. The model shows that environmental regulation reduces the informational
rent, thereby increasing investments. Nevertheless, the PH is confirmed only for the
specific parameters value.
3 Empirical literature
In this section we discuss the empirical framework commonly used in the literature study-
ing the link between environmental regulation and competitiveness.
Notion of “competitiveness” includes multiplicity of issues. According to Porter’s def-
inition, competitiveness is a superior productivity in terms of lower costs or ability to
oﬀer a product with a superior value that justify a premium price. (Porter, 1991). An
alternative definition of competitiveness is ability of an industry or a sector to sell cheaper
or better quality goods and services in both local and international markets (Peterson,
2003). Capacity to innovate and upgrade is the main prerequisite of international com-
petitiveness. Thus, the key questions related to investigation of environmental regulation
impact on competitiveness are likely to involve consideration of the following:
• Impact on plants survivorship;
• Impact on innovation;
• Impact on productivity;
• Impact on export behaviour;
• Impact on financial performance;
• Impact on production location of pollution-intensive goods and services.
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Manufacturing enterprises usually become a focus of the PH analysis, as on the one
hand, they are more likely to be disproportionately aﬀected by environmental regula-
tion, and on the other hand, they can relocate to other countries with less stringent
environmental standard (Jaﬀe et al., 1995).
The link between environmental regulation and each component of competitiveness
has been a subject of vast empirical analyses which, however, usually were carried out in
isolation. The relations are commonly investigated in a reduced-form model:
C = f(ER,Z)(1)
where C is competitiveness indicator;
ER is environmental regulation indicator;
Z are other controls.
For instance, in the context of “weak" PH, numerous studies address environmental
innovation response to environmental regulation (e.g. Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; De
Vries and Withagen, 2005; Johnstone et al., 2010). Although they commonly find that
environmental regulation stimulates certain kind of environmental innovation, there is
no guarantee that the direction or rate of this increased innovation is socially beneficial.
In other words, these studies do not consider the opportunity costs of environmental
innovation, and could not tell how regulation aﬀect overall performance and international
competitiveness of manufacturing sectors.
In contrast, many studies proving the “strong" PH use productivity measure (e.g.
Gray and Shadbegian, 1993, 2001; Lanoie et al., 2008), export measure (e.g.Costantini
and Mazzanti, 2011) or financial measures (e.g. Rassier and Earnhart, 2009) as a compet-
itiveness indicator. The evidence obtained from these studies are mixed, with uncertain
implications for productivity, export activity and financial performance.
The drawback of the above mentioned studies investigating on the “strong" PH, is that
focusing on a particular aspect of competitiveness in a reduced-form model they did not
reveal a specific channel through which environmental regulation aﬀects competitiveness.
To understand the mechanism that underlies the relations several paper used a combined
assessment and looked at the impact of environmental regulation on both innovation and
financial performance (e.g. Rennings and Rammer, 2011). These papers estimated a set
of reduced-form equations ( one by one) where innovation and financial performance is
a function of environmental regulation and other controls. There are also a few papers
that apply a sequential procedure and studied the link between environmental regulation
and innovation at the first stage, and then at the second stage investigated the eﬀect of
regulation induced-innovation, if any, on productivity (e.g. Hamamoto, 2006; Yang et
al., 2012).
The PH has been investigated at diﬀerent level of data aggregation. Surely, the most
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relevant level of data aggregation for investigation of competitiveness is by industry or
by firm. As stressed by Porter, regardless of striking diﬀerences in patterns of competi-
tiveness in every country, no nation can be competitive in every or even most industries
(Porter, 1990).The firm level evidence used by Porter to support his idea results from the
case studies rather than econometric investigations. Constrained with the data availabil-
ity for the econometric analysis, subsequent papers extend the investigation of the PH a
the firm-, sector-, industry- and country-levels.
In the following we review selected empirical papers addressing the PH. We summarise
the main variables, the data and relations derived in these papers in Tables 1-6 .
3.1 Innovation studies
According to the PH, in response to stringent environmental regulation a firm could intro-
duce innovation that addresses environmental impact, while improving product and/or
related process. The "product oﬀset" occurs when environmental regulation produces bet-
ter performing or higher quality good, safer product, lower product cost. The "process
oﬀset" occurs when environmental regulation results in improved resource productivity,
higher process yields or material savings.
Previous studies of the “weak” PH, investigated the eﬀect of environmental regulation
on green innovation proxied by relevant patents or R&D expenditure. For instance,
Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003 investigate the impact of increasing pollution expenditures
on number of environmental patent applications by US manufacturing industries in the
period of 1983 -1992. The paper confirmed the positive impact of environmental policy
on environmental patents.
In a cross-country setting De Vries and Withagen, 2005 focused on investigation of the
environmental policy eﬀects on innovation related to SO2 abatement in twelve European
countries, the US and Canada over the period 1970-2000. The strictness of environmental
policy is captured by diﬀerent proxies such as dummy variables of international agree-
ments on SO2 reduction (the agreement covers all countries under consideration, therefore
the policy variable is country-invariant) or environmental sensitivity performance index
(that is diﬀerent across countries, but constant over time). Using these indicators the pa-
per concluded that innovation do not have a significant relationship with environmental
regulation stringency. Alternatively, the paper considered the environmental regulation
as a latent variable that is contingent on gross domestic product, the industry structure
and the level of SO2 emissions. With the latter approach the paper found an evidence
that strict environmental regulation induces new SO2 abatement technologies.
Johnstone et al., 2010 examined the eﬀect of renewable energy policies, proxied by var-
ious environmental policy adoption dummies or a composite policy variable constructed
using principal component analysis, on technological innovation. The analysis is con-
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ducted using patent data in each of the technological areas of renewable energy (wind,
solar, geothermal, ocean, biomass, and waste) of 25 OECD countries over the period
1978-2003.The paper found that public policy plays a significant role in determining re-
newable energy patent applications. The other major policy-related finding of this paper
is that diﬀerent policies have a greater eﬀect on patent activity for some renewable en-
ergy sources than for others. In particular, quantity- based policy instruments such as
obligations and tradable certificates are most eﬀective in inducing innovations in wind
power technology. Price-based instruments such as investment incentives, tax measures
and tariﬀs are most eﬀective in encouraging innovation in solar, biomass, and waste-to-
energy technologies. Voluntary programs are not significant, except n the case of waste.
These findings are robust to alternative policy measures and model specifications.
The studies linking environmental regulation stringency with green innovation are
numerous, but due to the lack of green innovation data by sector the “weak” PH is usually
investigated at the aggregate country level. However, as mentioned earlier in the paper,
sector-level studies could be more appropriate in this context with respect to a country-
level analysis as the earlier better capture the sector-specific environmental policies eﬀect
and dynamics of competition that takes place within a sector. Moreover, while generally
concluding that environmental innovation positively responds to environmental policy,
these studies do not consider the opportunity costs of environmental innovation and
crowding out of innovation in the core business.
Several papers studied how environmental regulation aﬀect on overall (environmental
and non-environmental) innovation at the sectoral-level. Jaﬀe and Palmer, 1997 analysed
the relationship between stringency of environmental regulation, measured by environ-
mental regulatory compliance capital costs, and overall innovative activity in the US
manufacturing sectors over the period 1975-1991. Overall, the authors found a mixed
evidence with respect to the hypothesis that increased stringency of environmental regu-
lation spurs increased innovative activity by firms. In particular, they found a significant
positive link between sector-level of compliance costs and overall R&D expenditures.
However, no impact is confirmed for overall patents.
A similar framework and environmental regulation proxy were used for the number
of other countries. Hamamoto, 2006 estimated the R&D expenditures eﬀect of environ-
mental regulation for Japanese sectors over the period 1972-1982 and Yang et. al, 2012 -
for Taiwanese sectors over the period 1997-2003. Both papers showed that the pollution
control expenditures have a positive relationship with the R&D.
Kneller and Manderson, 2011 addressed the issue of opportunity costs of environmen-
tal regulation and crowd out eﬀect of non-environmental innovation, using sector-level
data from UK manufacturing industry during 2000-2006. The paper used pollution abate-
ment costs as a policy proxy and accounted for its likely endogeneity using the lags of
endogenous variables as instruments. The results indicated that while environmental
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R&D and investment in environmental capital are stimulated by greater pollution abate-
ment pressures there is no positive impact of environmental regulation on total R&D or
total capital accumulation. Therefore, the authors concluded that environmental R&D
crowds out non-environmental R&D. Still, there did not confirm that environmental cap-
ital crowds out non-environmental capital.
3.2 Survivorship studies
As well-know from the standard economics theory, it is optimal for a firm to close or exit
from the market, if its scrap-value exceeds the expected discounted profit of not exiting at
this time. It is also well-established in the empirical literature that productivity and exit
probability are negatively correlated (e.g. Syverson, 2011). Therefore, to estimate the
impact of environmental actions on firms economic performance exit behaviour is some-
times concerned, measured by conditional exit probability of a firm under environmental
regulation.
Greenstone et al., 2012 investigated exit behaviour and productivity response to air
quality regulation of the US plants belonging to diﬀerent manufacturing sectors in the
period of 1972-1993. The authors found a mixed evidence on air regulation eﬀect on
firm’s exit behaviour. In particular, plants in heavy-emitting industries are found to
to have higher exit probability when their county is a subject to ozone regulation. On
the contrary, several policies such as carbon monoxide and total suspended particulate
regulation are proved to bring a positive eﬀect on survivorship.
Yin et al., 2007 explored the reasons why some petroleum retail outlets in the US
are more likely to exit the market than others under the Underground Storage Tank
(UST) regulation introduced in the early 1980s. The major conclusion of the paper is
that environmental regulation has an uneven impact on diﬀerent types of petroleum out-
lets. Small outlets have greater diﬃculties in dealing with environmental regulation if
compliance cost is significant and are more likely to exit the market than bigger outlets.
The reason is that economies of scale provide large facilities with a competitive advan-
tage because it is more diﬃcult for small facilities to pass on compliance costs to their
customers. Liquidity constraints make small outlets more vulnerable to environmental
regulation due to lack of the financial capability to meet regulatory requirements.
The relations between environmental regulation and probability to shut down are in-
vestigated mostly for the US, while the evidence for the other countries is scant. One of
the few papers that focuses on exit behaviour of the European firms under stringent envi-
ronmental regulation is a paper of Biørn, 1998. This paper compared the exit probability
of regulated and non-regulated establishments in Norwegian manufacturing industries,
focusing on three highly regulated sectors such as pulp and paper, iron, steel and fer-
roalloys sectors, over the period 1976-1991. The regulation under consideration imposed
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restriction on annual emission quantities and/or maximum concentrations (quantity per
unit of volume). They authors concluded that non-regulated establishments had, ceteris
paribus, a higher exit probability than regulated establishments.
To summarise, due to lack of relevant data the impact of environmental regulation
on exit probability is less investigated. Further research employing cross-country data
would be required to get better understanding of the relations in this respect.
3.3 Productivity studies
The link between environmental regulation and productivity is the most relevant, as well
as the most controversial issue related to “strong” PH investigation. Since the 1980s a
large body of literature attempts to quantify the eﬀect of environmental regulation on
productivity at the plant-level for the US. The common conclusion of the earlier inves-
tigations is that environmental regulation has an adverse eﬀect on productivity in the
US. For instance, Gray and Shadbegian, 1993, 2001 investigated the link between envi-
ronmental policy stringency, measured by pollution abatement and control expenditures,
and plant-level TFP of the paper, oil, and steel industries in the US over the period
1979-1985. The authors concluded that environmental regulation caused a productivity
slowdown due to displacement of “productive” investment by environmental innovation.
Greenstone et al., 2012 estimated the eﬀect of the Clean Air regulation on plants‘ TFP
levels in the US in the period of 1972-1993. They found that among surviving polluting
plants, a more stringent regulation is commonly associated with a TFP decline. The
regulations governing ozone have particularly discernible eﬀects on productivity, though
eﬀects are also seen among particulates and sulfur dioxide emitters. On the contrary,
carbon monoxide regulation appears to increase measured TFP, though this appears to
be concentrated among refineries.
Berman and Bui, 1999 examined the eﬀect of regional air pollution regulation on the
productivity of oil refineries (one of the most regulated industries) in California in the
period 1979-1992. The authors proxied environmental regulation stringency with a count
of active regulations in each particular industry and year. The paper found econometric
evidence that regulation induced large investment in air pollution abatement capital,
that, in turn, enhanced productivity.
As far as the investigation of the other countries is concerned, the sector-level analyt-
ical framework has been commonly applied. Lanoie et al., 2008 focused on productivity
eﬀects of environmental regulation, proxied by share of abatement and control investment
in total cost, in the Quebec manufacturing sectors in the period 1985-1994. The paper
found the negative productivity eﬀect in the short-run. However, the eﬀect turned to be
positive for less polluting industries in the long-run. On the contrary, the productivity of
more polluting industries declines in the long-run period.
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Despite of extensive studies of productivity response to regulation for the US, there
are a few papers, employing the productivity indicator in the context of PH studies for
Europe. One of the very few papers related to Europe, is Marin and Lotti 2014 who
studied the impact of environmental patents (together with non-environmental patents)
on productivity of the Italian manufacturing firms in the period 1995-2006 at the firm-
level . The paper concluded that environmental patents have strong positive eﬀects on
productivity. However, they exhibit a lower return relative to other innovations, at least
in the short run, with the diﬀerential eﬀect being more pronounced for polluting firms.
It worth noting that in a sector- or a country-level model estimated productivity or
trade eﬀect is conditional on plants survivorship. Stringent regulation could result in
plants closing, as well as aﬀect aggregate productivity and trade indicators. Not account-
ing for survivorship in a sector- or a country-level model the true impact of environmental
regulation on productivity and international trade could be understated.
3.4 Trade studies
According to the trade theory, countries export those goods and services that they make
relatively more eﬃciently than other nations, and import those goods and services that
are relatively less eﬃcient at producing. Hence, the eﬀect of environmental policy on
competitiveness could be measured by identifying the eﬀect that it would have on net
exports. 2
Tobey, 1990 and 1993 was the first to investigate econometrically relation between
environmental policy, proxied by pollution abatement capital expenditure, and interna-
tional trade in a multi-country framework. The papers examined the impact of omit-
ting the environmental policy stringency indicator on multilateral trade flow using the
“Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model”. The results don’t confirm the causal relations between
environmental policy and international trade. Similarly, the other earlier trade studies
commonly conclude that environmental regulation has a negligible or even negative eﬀect
on export.
There is a limitation of using multilateral trade flow as a dependent variable when
studying environmental policy-trade relations, as diﬀerential eﬀects of environmental pol-
icy on various trade flows may cancel out due to aggregation. Thus, more recent studies
use the “gravity model" approach and employ a bilateral trade flow as a dependent vari-
able (e.g. Van Beers and Van den Bergh, 2000; Costantini and Crespi, 2008; Costantini
and Mazzanti 2011). These papers find a mixed evidence in support of the “strong” PH.
2 The theoretically required condition would be to hold real wages and exchange rates constant, so as
to be sure, that it is not relative labour cost or exchange rate shift that drive the net export (Jaﬀe et
al., 1995). However, the data are not easily available, so it is diﬃcult from empirical point of view to
include these controls into export equations. Due to unavailability of the perfect indicator net from the
above mentioned adjustments, the net export is widely used as a proxy of competitiveness.
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For instance, Van Beers and Van den Bergh, 2000 performed a gravity analysis with
the 1975 data employed by Tobey, for five dirty sectors, and a country sample similar
to Tobey’s. The environmental regulation in this paper is proxied by the self-reporting
score of a country’s perceived stringency obtained from the questionnaire. The authors
confirmed a positive impact of environmental policy on international export in paper
industry. However, no relations are found for chemical and steel industry, and negative
relations are derived for mining and non-ferrous metals.
Using the panel of OECD countries in the period 1996 - 2005, Costantini and Crespi,
2008 focused on the energy sector and looked at the impact of CO2 emission and envi-
ronmental tax on export of environmental technologies of this sector. The authors found
the evidence supporting the ”weak" PH. They concluded that countries with stringent
environmental standards have a higher export capacity for those environmental-friendly
technologies that regulation induces to adopt.
Investigated the “strong” PH, Costantini and Mazzanti 2011 studied export behaviour
of diﬀerent manufacturing sectors under stringent environmental regulation in 15 Eu-
ropean countries in the period 1996-2007. Environmental regulation is measured by
diﬀerent indicators such as energy and environmental tax revenues as percentage of to-
tal revenues, pollution abatement and control expenditures as percentage of GDP and
number of eco-management and audit scheme initiatives by private firms as percent-
age of GDP. Divergent eﬀects played by diﬀerent policies are ascertained, demonstrating
that the PH is not to be taken for granted and it is sector-specific, as well as policy
instrument-specific. Overall, picture is nevertheless largely in favour of positive eﬀects of
environmental policies on the EU competitiveness. In particular, the high tech sector is
the one that responds more positively to energy and environmental taxation. However,
the paper did not find any eﬀect when using pollution abatement and control expendi-
tures and number of eco-management and audit scheme initiatives by private firms as
environmental regulation proxy.
All in all, trade studies designed to test the PH hypothesis have shown so far a mixed
evidence.
3.5 Financial studies
Number of recent empirical papers assessed the strong version of the Porter Hypothesis
examining the impact of environmental regulation on firms’ financial performance. These
paper usually use the cross-section firm-level framework. As a measure of financial per-
formance they commonly use return on sales, return on assets (e.g. Russo and Fouts,
1997), Tobins q (Konar and Cohen, 2001; Rassier and Earnhart, 2009) or firm‘s price
cost margin (Rennings and Rammer, 2011). Return on sales or return on assets is an
accounting-based measures of financial performance that indicates how eﬀectively a firm
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is utilizing its resources to generate profits. Tobins q is a market-based measure, that re-
flects investors expectations of the discounted present value of future profits. It is defined
as a ratio of a firms market value to the replacement cost of the firms assets.
As far as Tobin‘s q is concerned, Rassier and Earnhart, 2009 investigated whether
a more stringent Clean Water regulation in the US limits an expected Tobin q and
undermines future financial performance of the US firms in the period of 1995-1997.
By decomposing Tobin q into its constituent components, such as market value and
replacement costs, and estimating each component separately, they found that tighter
permitted discharge limits lower both components with a larger impact on market value,
which implies that investors revise their expectations of the discounted present value of
future profits in response to a more stringent Clean Water regulation.
In a cross-section framework Rennings and Rammer, 2011 studied impact of diﬀerent
environmental policies on price cost margin (computed as a share of sales net of input
cost in total sales) of German firms in the period 2000-2002 using the data from German
Innovation Panel. They found that process innovations exert a negative impact on firms
price cost margin, while product innovations motivated by some type of environmental
policy, such as regulation on recycling, waste management or resource eﬃciency, result in
a positive profitability impact. The authors sum up saying “..environmental innovations
on average do not perform worse compared to other innovations...However, if we look at
specific environmental policy fields, we find winners and losers of environmental policy”
(Rennings and Rammer 2011).
A common limitation of financial studies is that (with the exception of the US) due to
lack of data availability, they rely on a single observation year and a single country, which
naturally restricts a generalisation of the results. Longitudinal data would certainly be
helpful in order to learn more about the time dimension between environmental regulation
and financial performance.
3.6 Combined assessment
The drawback of the studies discussed so far is that investigating the “weak“ or the
“strong“ proposition of the PH in isolation they do not reveal a true mechanism through
which environmental regulation aﬀects, if any, productivity, financial performance and
export behaviour. There is a conflicting view on eﬀect generated by environmental regu-
lation on comparative advantages, known as the Polution Heaven Hypothesis (hereafter
PHH, Copeland and Taylor, 1995). In the context of trade liberalisation in developing
countries, it states that being a subject to strict regulation, a firm either contract pro-
duction to foreign manufacturing firms (outsourcing) or invest in foreign manufacturing
facilities and produce abroad. 3 In light of the alternative perspectives, an analysis that
3 See Brunnermeier and Levinson, 2004 for the literature review of Pollution Haven Hypothesis.
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disentangle the mechanism by which firms respond to environmental regulation is of high
relevance.
To address this issue several papers provided a sequential estimation and studied at
the first step the link between environmental regulation and innovation, and then at the
second step, the link between induced innovation, if any, and productivity. Hamamoto,
2006 estimated an impact of regulation on R&D and capital modernisation of manufac-
turing sectors in Japan. Having showed that the pollution control expenditures have a
positive relationship with R&D and a negative relationship with the average age of capital
stock, the paper further estimated how induced R&D and change in the average age of
capital stock aﬀect productivity. The paper concluded that R&D increase stimulated by
the regulatory stringency have a positive eﬀect on productivity growth, whereas the eﬀect
of changes in the average age of capital stock is insignificant. In a similar framework Yang
et al., 2012 examined whether stringent environmental regulation induce more R&D and
promote further productivity in Taiwan in the period 1997-2003. The finding supports
both the “weak” and the “strong” Porter hypothesis.
Several recent papers addressing the “strong” PH at the firm-level, directly intro-
duced the variable of induced innovation in the model and compared its economic eﬀect
with the eﬀect of the other innovations (e.g. Rennings and Rammer, 2011; Marin et al.
2014). The induced innovation variable is constructed from the survey that asked firms to
report innovations triggered by environmental regulation. Using the German data, Ren-
nings and Rammer, 2011 investigated if firms with induced innovations achieved similar
innovation success and the level of profit (proxied by price-cost margin) as the other (non-
environmental) innovators. The paper found a negative impact of induced innovation on
the probability to introduce market novelties, and no impact on the share of sales gen-
erated by market novelties within the group of firms that introduced similar innovation.
Moreover, induced environmental process innovation found to yield a lower price-cost
margin, whereas product innovation triggered by resource eﬃciency regulation is found
to increase firm profitability. In a similar framework, Marin and Lotti, 2014 studied the
impact of induced patents and other patents on productivity of Italian manufacturing
firms. The paper concluded that environmental patents have strong positive eﬀects on
productivity. However, they exhibit a lower return relative to other innovations, at least
in the short run, with the diﬀerential eﬀect being more pronounced for polluting firms.
4 Measures of environmental policy
The issue of measurement of environmental regulation stringency became one of the main
challenge of the PH empirical studies. There are several problems related to measurement
of environmental policy eﬀort of a country or a sector. First, sophisticated environmental
policy design makes an evaluation of overall policy eﬀort problematic. The diversity of
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policy instruments applied in diﬀerent countries and change of instruments composition
over time hamper comparability across countries and over time. There appears to be quite
wide general consensus on the importance of using multiple policy instruments in order
to address the variable barriers for environmental eﬃciency. Typical policies that target
industrial environmental performance include regulations and voluntary agreements that
directly compel actions; economic policy instruments such as taxes and tax incentives,
directed financial support (e.g. subsidies and loans) and diﬀerentiated energy prices that
seek to influence the cost eﬀectiveness of technical actions; and informational policies,
which help improve information provision for companies and establish a favourable en-
vironment to implement environmental actions (Reinaud and Goldberg 2011). Second,
there is a limited availability of data that allow to construct time-variant indicator of
environmental regulation. Furthermore, as stringency of environmental regulation is a
multidimensional notion, a general incompleteness of all available stringency indicators is
related to inability to capture some important aspects of environmental regulation such
as sophistication of regulatory structure, strictness of enforcement, quality of environ-
mental institutions and of available environmental information, subsidisation of natural
resources. Unfortunately, the data on these aspects of regulation are generally unavail-
able.
Various environmental regulation indicators, summarised in Table 7, were employed
in the empirical investigations, however subject to numerous drawbacks. In the following
section we discuss each indicator, in turn.
4.1 Single policy indicators
The empirical literature often studies how specific environmental policy aﬀect compet-
itiveness. For example, several studies investigate impact of environmental taxation,
increasingly favoured recently by the EU countries (Constantini and Crespi 2007, Con-
stantini and Mazzanti, 2011). An environmental tax is a tax whose tax base is a physical
unit that has a proven specific negative eﬀect on the environment. The tax includes
energy taxes, transport taxes, pollution taxes and resource taxes. In the context of the
PH studies environmental tax is usually proxied by environmental tax revenue share in
total government revenue. However, low revenue from environmental taxes could reflect
higher tax rate that have had the eﬀect of changing behavioural patterns. Therefore, a
more appropriate indicator is the one that adjusts the environmental tax revenues by a
corresponding aggregate tax base. As far as energy tax is concerned, implicit tax rate
calculated as energy tax revenue in relation to final energy consumption, could be a better
proxy of energy tax rate. However this indicator has not been yet exploited in the PH
studies.
Another commonly used proxies are policy adoption dummies. Various policies such
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as international environmental protocols, environmental taxes, investment incentives, dif-
ferentiated tariﬀs, voluntary programs, government support of green R&D are proxied
in the econometric model in this way (e.g. De Vries and Withagen, 2005; Johnstone
et al., 2010). The advantage of this approach is that dummy variables are easy to con-
struct. However, their serious drawback that they do not tell about regulation stringency.
Moreover, dummy variables could mistakenly capture eﬀects not related to regulation
(e.g. related to time trends). Furthermore, Including all policy dummies may cause
multicollinearity. At the same time, including policy dummies one-by-one may lead to
incorrect conclusions due to omitted variables and possible interaction eﬀects among the
diﬀerent policies.
All in all, a complex policy design makes an evaluation of a single policy problematic.
Recent environmental policy consists of combination of programs, rather then a single
policy. Controlling for a single policy in an econometric model could result in omitted
variable bias.
4.2 Aggregate indicators
Taking into account the above-mentioned, many authors investigate the impact of overall
rigour of various regulation, rather than a single policy. An aggregate environmental
regulation indicators used in these studies could be divided into four broad groups: mea-
sure of compliance costs, composite indicators, indirect measure of emission levels and
indirect measures of induced innovation. Popular proxies for regulatory stringency are
data on private sector abatement expenditures. Such data inform on the level of financial
eﬀort a given firm/sector has to face to comply with given standards (Jaﬀe and Palmer,
1997; Gray and Shadbegian, 2001; Berman and Bui, 2001; Hamamoto, 2006). Pollution
abatement and control (PAC) activities are purposeful activities aimed directly at the
prevention, reduction and elimination of pollution or nuisances arising as a residual of
production processes or the consumption of goods and services (OECD 1996). PACE
are consequence of government environmental policies and regulations and comprises the
flow of investment and current expenditure that is directly aimed at pollution abatement
and control. The justification of this indicator is based on the assumption that profit
maximising firms typically face marginal abatement costs that are increasing in pollu-
tion abatement. However, pollution abatement costs (PACs) are plagued with reverse
causality and endogeneity issues that we discuss in the next section.
Another popular measure of environmental policies is emission or energy use intensity
(e.g. De Vries and Withagen, 2005; Constantini and Crespi, 2008). Indeed, these measure
captures only the policies addressing emission reduction. However, its interpretation dif-
fers from one study to another. Lower CO2 emission is the evidence of applying stringent
(and eﬃcient) environmental regulation and higher eﬀort regarding Kyoto abatement tar-
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gets. Whereas De Vries and Withagen, 2005 treat emissions variable other way round,
saying that if a country has a relatively high level of SO2 emissions, environmental strin-
gency in that country will be relatively more intense. Besides the ambiguous assumption
behind this measure, emissions intensity suﬀers from the endogeneity, as it is determined
by economic performance. Aggregated over firms or sectors, these variables are also
likely to mirror changes such as factor prices rather than regulatory stringency. When
they are used at the disaggregated level, it is often hard to build indicators that can be
used in cross sectoral or cross country analysis due to the heterogeneity of the regulated
pollutants.
Several papers used qualitative indicators such as Index of Environmental Sensitivity
Performance as a proxy of overall environmental regulation (De Vries and Withagen,
2005). The data used to this end include information on the presence or absence of a
given policy (0-1 indicators) or scores from surveys of government oﬃcials or business
leaders (Tobey, 1990; Kellenberg, 2009). Moreover, the composite indicators are usually
time-invariant, and, therefore, do not allow to track environmental regulation eﬀect over
time.
Several recent papers developed a time-variant composite indicator of renewable en-
ergy policies across European countries (Johnstone et al. 2010; Vona and Nicolli, 2012).
As the indicators focus on the renewable energy policy that barely aﬀects manufacturing
enterprises, the scope of application of these indicators in the PH context is naturally
restricted.
4.3 Endogeneity and simultaneity
The issue complicating investigation of environmental regulation eﬀect on competitive-
ness in an econometric model is causal relationships running in both directions. There
are several reasons why causation could run from competitiveness to environmental reg-
ulation. Firstly, when using pollution abatement expenditures as a policy measure, they
could be simultaneously determined with innovation. Induced innovation designed to
lower costs of compliance could decrease pollution abatement expenditures. Secondly,
in the financial studies financial performance could be simultaneously determined with
environmental regulation. According to political-economy models in order to maximize
political support, regulators may impose regulation that is inversely related to a firm
financial performance. In this case financial performance could aﬀect environmental reg-
ulation. Thirdly, simultaneity could arise at the sector- or country-level studies because
increased productivity and international trade could leads to higher per capita income,
that, in turn, could result in to greater demand for environmental quality. Environmental
regulations could thus be a function of economic performance and international trade.
Another problem that could bias environmental regulation eﬀect in the econometric
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model addressing the PH, in particular at the sector- or country-level, is unobserved
heterogeneity. Unobserved attributes determining economic performance, could be cor-
related with environmental regulatory stringency. If the data is used at the aggregated
level, such as sectors or countries, changes in PACs might result from changes due to
unobserved heterogeneity rather than from changes in regulatory stringency. Like, high
compliance costs could indicate an ineﬀective response (due to low level of expertise in
dealing with environmental regulation or to low productivity eﬃciency) instead of high
levels of stringency. Moreover, a low level of compliance costs does not necessarily mean
that a country is not eﬀectively protecting its environment. In fact, the indicator tends to
emphasis clean-up costs at the expense of cost reductions which could be due to reduced
emissions or more eﬀective protection measures. Alternatively, extremely severe regula-
tions might cause many plants to close down, leading to measured compliance costs being
low rather than high (Jaﬀe et al. ,1997). Finally, in the presence of market of behavioral
failues abatement expenditures no longer successfully measure the level of regulatory pres-
sure (Berman and Bui, 2001). In the context of environmental regulation-export linkage,
another source of omitted variable bias is export rebates and import surcharges, that usu-
ally could not be controlled for due to data unavailability. As highlighted by Van Beers
and Van den Bergh, 2000 there is a possibility that the country spending a substantial
part of its financial resources to abate pollution may also provides financial assistance as
a compensation for increased production costs to pollution cost-sensitive industries. Not
controlling for it in the model, may produce overestimation of the regulation eﬀect.
In the presence of the omitted variable bias, application of panel data models has an
advantage of allowing to control for unobserved heterogeneity as long as it is assumed to be
time-invariant. What concerns the simultaneity problem it could be addressed employing
an instrumental variable approach that account for the simultaneity of environmental
policy, like for example it is done in the papers investigating the PHH of Ederington and
Minier, 2003, Levinson and Taylor, 2003, and Xing and Kolstad, 2002. Moreover, proper
treatment of a lag structure reduce the simultaneity problem. The existing literature does
not explicitly account for these two-way causal relations with the exception of Kneller
and Manderson, 2012.
Apparently, to avoid some of the above discussed biases it would be preferable to
use a measure that reflect government’s eﬀort towards environmental regulations, rather
then response indicators like PACE, that capture regulation compliance costs, or emission
intensity, that capture regulations results and eﬀectiveness. Unfortunately, a reliable ag-
gregate measure that captures government eﬀort, rather then outcomes of environmental
regulation is not available.
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4.4 Dynamic eﬀect
Finally, an important issue in the empirical setting of the PH the dynamic eﬀect of envi-
ronmental regulation. Many studies look at the contemporaneous eﬀect of environmental
regulation. However, innovations might take several years to develop, and capital expen-
ditures are often delayed for a few years through normal budgetary cycles and building
lags (Jaﬀe and Palmer, 1997, Lanoie et al, 2008, Ambec et.al 2011). Therefore, environ-
mental regulation adopted today will aﬀect firms performance a few years down the road
when the innovation process and/or changes in production will have been completed. For
this reason it is important to allow for one or more lags in the environmental regulation
variable.
5 Conclusions
This paper oﬀers a critical review of the large empirical literature on the Porter Hypothesis
(PH) investigating the relations between environmental regulation and competitiveness.
According to the PH, stringent environmental policy could result in a in-winituation of
better environmental quality and higher firmsroductivity and international competitive-
ness. Though the argument has been long debated in the literature, the evidence obtained
so far still remains inconclusive. The literature often supports the “weak” PH confirming
positive impact of environmental regulation on green innovation. However, the stud-
ies focusing on environmental innovation eﬀect, usually do not consider the opportunity
costs of environmental innovation and potential crowding out of innovation in the core
business.
As regards to the “strong” PH, the investigations have not been successful so far in
finding robust support of enhanced productivity, export activity and financial perfor-
mance under environmental regulation. The common drawback of these studies is that
they investigated the “weak” and “strong” version of the PH in isolation and therefore,
do not explicitly verify a specific channel through which environmental regulation aﬀects
economic performance and competitiveness. To reveal the causal links between envi-
ronmental regulation and competitiveness, implied by the PH, combined assesment of
innovation and competitiveness eﬀects is required. In this way one can be sure to identify
the true channel of regulation impact. Still, only a few papers follow this approach.
Furthermore, the issue complicating investigation of the PH is measurement of envi-
ronmental regulation stringency, simultaneity between environmental regulation, innova-
tion and competitiveness and unobserved heterogeneity arising in the econometric model.
Failure to take account of this endogeneity problem could lead to a bias estimates of en-
vironmental regulation eﬀect. With the exception of several recent papers, this issue left
unexplored in the PH literature.
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The PH has been investigated at diﬀerent level of data aggregation such as firm-,
sector-, industry- and country-levels. Extensive research on both alternative hypotheses
of the PH were carried out for the US, using both plant- and sector-level data, various
innovation and competitiveness indicators. In contrast, due to the limited data avail-
ability Europe is much less investigated, although the issue of implications of stringent
environmental regulation on the firm’s competitiveness is of high relevance. In particular,
very few papers carried out the cross-country analysis at firm- or sector-level. However,
if there is indeed a PH story in the data, it is more likely to be found at the disaggregated
level. Moreover, the papers investigating Europe mainly focused on specific new technolo-
gies in the environmental goods sector, and left aside very relevant to the propositions
of the PH issues of productivity response, financial performance and firm survivorship to
stringent environmental regulation. Therefore, we believe there is a gap in the empirical
PH literature that needed to be fulfilled as soon as data for European countries become
available. This can be a topic for future research.
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Tab. 1: Selected innovation studies of the PH
Study Competitiveness
indicator
Environmental regulation
proxy
Other controls Sample and level of ag-
gregation
Estimated regulation
eﬀect
Jaﬀe and
Palmer, 1997
Patents, R&D ex-
penditures
1-year lagged, 5-years moving
avg. PACE
VA, government R&D,
foreign patents
U.S. manufacturing
sector-level, 1973-1991
positive for R&D, insign
for patents
Brunnermeier
and Cohen,
2003
Environmental
patents
contemporaneous and 1-2 years
lagged PACE, pollution related
inspections
Industry shipments value,
concentration, capital in-
tensity and export inten-
sity
US manufacturing sector-
level, 1983-1992
positive
Vries and
Withagen,
2005
SO2 reduction re-
lated patents
Dummies for the year of inter-
national environmental protocols
on SO2, time-invariant binary
Index of Environmental Sensitiv-
ity Performance, SO2 emission
level
GDP, people active in
R&D, % of industry VA
from total VA, general
trend variable
14 countries (Europe, US
and Canada), environ-
mental goods sector, 1980-
2000
insign for dummies and
index variable, positive
for SO2 emission level
Johnstone,
Hasic and
Popp (2010)
Renewable energy
patents by techno-
logical area
Dummy of public R&D, tax
measures, investment incentives,
diﬀerentiated tariﬀs, voluntary
programs, quantity obligations,
tradable certificates, policy clus-
ters, composite policy variable
(contemporaneous to 4-years
lags)
Specific R&D expendi-
tures, electricity consump-
tion,electricity price,total
EPO filings
25 OECD countries, re-
newable energy sector,
1978-2003
policy specific
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Tab. 2: Selected survivorship studies of the PH
Study Competitiveness
indicator
Environmental regula-
tion proxy
Other controls Sample and level of ag-
gregation
Estimated regulation
eﬀect
Biørn, 1998 Conditional exit
probability
Dummy variable for facili-
ties under annual emission
quantities and/or maxi-
mum concentrations regu-
lations
Size of petroleum outlets,
size of petroleum retail
firms that own those out-
lets, tank ages
Norwegian pulp and pa-
per, iron, steel and ferroal-
loys and chemical sectors,
firm-level, 1976-1991
negative for pulp and
paper, iron, steel and
ferroalloys sectors
Yin et al.,
2007
Conditional exit
probability
Time variable of Un-
derground Storage Tank
regulation introduc-
tion, regulatory vari-
able*petroleum outlet
size, regulatory vari-
able*tank age, regulatory
variable*tank capacity
Size of petroleum outlets,
size of petroleum retail
firms that own those out-
lets, tank ages
Michigan petroleum re-
tail market, firm-level,
1992000
negative for small busi-
ness
Greenstone
et al., 2012
Conditional exit
probability
Country-level dummy
variables of ozone, total
suspended particulates,
sulfur dioxide, carbon
monoxide regulations
Census-geographic-
division-by-year or
Census-geographic-
division-by-ASM-panel
fixed eﬀects, plant fixed
eﬀects
U.S. manufacturing,
plant-level, 1972-1993
positive for ozone reg-
ulation, negative for
CO2 regulation, in-
significant for TSP and
SO2 regulation
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Tab. 3: Selected financial studies of the PH
Study Competitiveness
indicator
Environmental regula-
tion proxy
Other controls Sample and level of ag-
gregation
Estimated regulation
eﬀect
Russo and
Fouts, 1997
Return on assets Environmental ratings 4-biggest firm concentra-
tion ratio, firm growth
rate, firm size, capital in-
tensity, advertising inten-
sity, industry growth rate
firm-level, 1992-1993,
cross-section analysis
negative
Rassier and
Earnhart,
2009
Tobin q Permitted limits for
wastewater discharges
3-years sales growth, cap-
ital intensity, assets age,
firm size, current ratio,
R&D intensity, market
share, concentration of the
industry in which the firm
operates, average size of
the facilities owned by a
firm, year dummy
the U.S. chemical sector,
firm-level, 1995-2000
negative
Rennings
and Ram-
mer, 2011
Price cost mar-
gin (categorial
variable)
Dummies of environmen-
tal regulation by environ-
mental domains
Herfindahl index, stock
of patents and past R&D
expenditure over sales,
export activity, age,
size, capital-labour ratio,
dummy of foreign-owned
firm, innovation success
variables
German manufactur-
ing, firm-level, 2003,
cross-section analysis
policy specific
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Tab. 4: Selected productivity studies of the PH
Study Competitiveness
indicator
Environmental regula-
tion proxy
Other controls Sample and level of ag-
gregation
Estimated regulation
eﬀect
Gray and
Shadbegian,
1993
TFP/LP levels,
TFP growth
(Change of) PACE cur-
rent expenditures share in
total shipment , count
of environmental inspec-
tions, fraction of times
a plant is in compliance,
emission level
Capital vintage 3 US manuf. sectors,
plant-level, 1979-1985
negative for PACE cur-
rent exp., insign for other
policy proxies
Gray and
Shadbegian,
2001
TFP level, Output PACE current expendi-
tures share in total ship-
ment, PACE*technology
dummy, PACE*vintage
dummy
Labor, materials and energy
expenditures in real terms, real
capital stock, time-invariant
technology and vintage dummies
US paper and pulp indus-
try, plant-level, 1979-1990
negative
Berman and
Bui, 2001
TFP growth Count of active regula-
tions
State dummy, year dummy US petroleum refining in-
dustries, plant-level, 1987-
1995
positive
Lanoie, Pa-
try and Laje-
unesse, 2008
TFP growth PACE capital expendi-
tures share in total cost -
Contemp.,1-2Y lagged, 3Y
moving average
Change in level of output, ca-
pacity utilisation index, pollut-
ing sector and exposed to com-
petition sector dummies, strin-
gency of occupational safety and
health regulation
Quebec manufacturing
sectors, sector-level data
1985-1994
negative short-term ef-
fect, positive long-term
eﬀect for less polluting in-
dustries
Greenstone
et al., 2012
TFP level Country-level dummy
variables of ozone, total
suspended particulates,
sulfur dioxide, carbon
monoxide regulations
Census-geographic-division-
by-year or Census-geographic-
division-by-ASM-panel fixed
eﬀects, plant fixed eﬀects
U.S. manufacturing,
plant-level, 1972-1993
negative eﬀect of ozone
regulation positive eﬀect
of carbon monoxide reg-
ulation on refineries pro-
ductivity
Marin and
Lotti., 2014
TFP level Induced patents Italian manufacturing
firms, 1995-2006
positive
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Tab. 5: Selected international trade studies of the PH
Study Competitiveness
indicator
Environmental regula-
tion proxy
Other controls Sample and level of ag-
gregation
Estimated regu-
lation eﬀect
Tobey, 1990 Multilateral export
flows
Time invariant self-
reported env.regulation
strictness measure for
exporting and importing
countries against the US
as benchmark country
23 developed and de-
veloping countries, cross-
section for year 1975
insign
Van Beers and
Van den Bergh
et al., 2000
Bilateral export
flow: aggregate
and for pollution
intensive sectors
Self-reported environmen-
tal regulation measure
of a country’s perceived
stringency obtained
from the questionnaire
(time-invariant)
Exporting and importing country
GDP, population, geographic dis-
tances, land area, dummy of partic-
ipation in EC and EFTA, % R&D
expenditures, FDI as %GDP, World
bank index of rule of law
23 developed and develop-
ing countries, sector-level
data cross-section 1975
positive for paper
industry, insign for
chemicals and steel,
negative for min-
ing and non-ferrous
metals
Costantini and
Crespi, 2007
Bilateral export
flow related to
env.-friendly tech-
nologies in energy
sector
Public and private cur-
rent PACE as %GDP,
public investments on
environmental protection
as %GDP, energy and
env.tax revenue/total
revenues, Kyoto Protocol,
CO2 emissions %GDP
GDP, population, geographic dis-
tances, number of patents in energy
sector, the number of total patents
from residents, % of R&D expen-
ditures, technological capability in-
dex for importing countries, FDI as
%GDP, World bank index of rule of
law
OECD countries, tech-
nologies for energy sector,
1996 - 2005
positive
Costantini and
Mazzanti, 2011
Bilateral export
flow
1-year lagged PACE as a
% GDP, energy and envi-
ronmental tax as % total
revenues, EMAS
1-2 years lagged net export, geo-
graph. border, extensive and in-
tensive trade margins, similarity in-
dex, knowledge stock for exp. coun-
tries, tech. capability index for imp.
countries, country-pair size, relative
endown., firms heterogeneity, temp.
shocks and geograph. dummies
EU15 countries, 5 macro-
sectors,1996-2007
positive eﬀect of
environmental tax
in high-tech sector,
sector and policy
specific
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Tab. 6: Selected combined studies of the PH
Study Competitiveness
indicator
Environmental regula-
tion proxy
Other controls Sample and level
of aggregation
Estimated regulation
eﬀect
Rave and
Rammer, 2011
Indicators of prod-
uct innovations
novelty, ability to
achieve unit cost
reductions for pro-
cess innovations,
firm profitability
Dummies of environmen-
tal regulation by environ-
mental domains
Firm size, R&D activity, share of
graduated employees, location, co-
operation in innovation activities
German manufac-
turing, firm-level,
2003
policy and innovation
specific
Hamamoto,
2006
R&D expenditures 1-year lagged PACE Government R&D subsidy, VA Japanese manuf.
sector-level, 1966-
1976
positive innov. eﬀect
TFP growth Regulation induced incre-
mental R&D
Non-regulation induced incremental
R&D, change in average age of cap-
ital stock
positive productivity
eﬀect
Yan, 2012 R&D expenditures 1-year lagged PACE Taiwan manuf.
sector-level,
positive innov. eﬀect
TFP growth Regulation induced incre-
mental R&D
Non-regulation induced incremental
R&D, change in average age of cap-
ital stock
positive productivity
eﬀect
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Tab. 7: Regulation variables in the literature
Variables Relevant papers Drawbacks and endogeneity issues
PACE, PACE/VA,
PACE/GDP, PACE/Total
Cost, PACE/Shipments
Jaﬀe and Palmer, 1997; Brun-
nermeier and Cohen,1998;
Gray and Shadbegian,1993,
2001; Costantini and Maz-
zanti, 2011
Depend on the nature of an industry’s response to regula-
tion (due to organisational eﬃciency, innovativeness), energy-
intensity of the industry, simultaneity problem: possibly
better performing industries are more regulated, don’t con-
sider possible subsidies for the enterprises burdened by the
regulation-induced production costs increase, self-reported
measures, could suﬀer from the measurement errors.
Emission/Energy use level,
Emission/Energy Intensity
De Vries and Withagen, 2005;
Constantini and Crespi, 2008
Ambiguous interpretation, depends on economic performance
and structural change of industry/country, oil prices, milder
weather, economic conditions etc.
Count of active regulations Gray and Shadbegian,1993;
Berman and Bui, 1999;
Costantini and Mazzanti, 2011
.No information about policy stringency
Policy adoption dummies Johnstone et al, 2008 No information about policy stringency, could lead to multi-
colinearity problems
Self-reported indicators Tobey, 1990, 1993
Composite indicators of
environmental regulation
Johnston, 2010; Vona and
Nicolli, 2012
Share of environmental tax
revenue in total govern-
ment revenue
Constantini and Crespi, 2008,
Costantini and Mazzanti, 2011
Depend on energy-intensity of industry, simultaneity prob-
lem: possibly better performing industries are more regulated,
don’t consider possible subsidies for the enterprises burdened
by the regulation-induced production costs increase
Green patents Rennings and Rammer, 2011,
Martin and Lotti, 2014
Environmental regulation and
competitiveness: empirical evidence from
European manufacturing sectors
Abstract
This paper represents an empirical investigation of the eaknd trongorter Hypothesis (PH) fo-
cusing on the manufacturing sectors of European countries between 1997 and 2009. By and
large, the literature has analyzed the impact of environmental regulation on innovation and on
productivity generally in separate analyses and mostly focusing on the USA. The few existing
studies focusing on Europe investigate the eﬀect of environmental regulation either on green
innovation or on performance indicators such as exports. We instead look at overall innovation
and productivity impact that are the most relevant indicators for the trongH. This approach
allows us to account for potential opportunity costs of induced innovations. As a proxy of en-
vironmental policy stringency we use pollution abatement and control expenditures (PACE),
which represent one of the few indicators available at the sectoral level. We remedy upon its
main drawback, that of potential endogeneity of PACE, by adopting an instrumental variable
estimation approach. We find evidence of a positive impact of environmental regulation on the
output of innovation activity, as proxied by patents, thus providing support in favor of the eakH
in line with most of the literature. On the other front, we find no evidence in favor or against
the trongH, as productivity appears to be unaﬀected by the degree of pollution control and
abatement eﬀorts.
1
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1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate the impact of environmental regulation on the economic per-
formance of the European manufacturing sectors. The standard neoclassical view holds
that (strict) environmental regulation adversely aﬀects productivity and competitiveness
by imposing constraints on industry behavior. On one hand, firms face direct costs such
as end-of-pipe equipment or the R&D investment necessary to modify production activ-
ities. On the other hand, firms’ budgets are limited due to financial constraints. By
committing resources to comply with regulation, firms also bear indirect costs because
they cannot invest in other more profitable endeavors related, for example, to their core
business (see Gray and Shadbegian, 1993).
Porter (1991) and Porter and Van der Linde (1995) challenged this view by arguing
that well-established environmental policy would benefit both the environment and the
firm. Well-crafted and well-enforced regulation would push the firm to pursue otherwise
neglected investment opportunities, resulting in a “win-win” situation of better environ-
mental quality and higher firms’ productivity.
Such an outcome, which has been referred to as Porter Hyposesis (PH), arises because
firms face market imperfections, such as imperfect information, organisational inertia
or control problems. In Porter’s view, environmental regulation would push firms to
overcome some of these market failures by promoting innovation aimed at lowering the
cost of compliance. Regulation-induced innovation would in turn result in increased
resource eﬃciency, higher product value and enhanced firms’ productivity. As a result,
compliance costs could be oﬀset and firms would have a competitive advantage with
respect to, for example, firms in foreign countries not subject to similar regulation.
Initially formulated in rather general terms, the PH can be declined as three possible
and distinct research statements (Jaﬀe and Palmer, 1997). First, the “narrow” version of
the PH postulates that flexible environmental regulation, such as market-based instru-
ments, increases firms’ incentives to innovate compared to prescriptive regulation, such as
performance-based or technology-based standards. Second, the “weak” version of the PH
postulates the positive eﬀect of well-crafted environmental regulations on environmental
innovations (even when environmental innovation comes at an opportunity cost that ex-
ceeds its benefits for a firm). Finally, the “strong” PH states that innovation induced by
well-crafted environmental regulation could more than oﬀset additional regulatory costs,
and, consequently, increase firm’ s competitiveness and productivity.
Since the early 1990s proving or disproving the PH with empirical evidence has been
the focus of much literature (see Rubashkina, 2013 for a review). Most of the studies,
however, focus on the US, while the empirical evidence for Europe is scant. This is par-
ticularly troublesome given the recent European policy developments. Since the end of
1980s the European environmental policy became more stringent. An initial commitment
1 Introduction 2
to the strategic reorientation of environmental policies in the EU gradually took place
since 1987 , with the introduction of the 4th Environment Action Programme (EAP)
(Hey, 2006). Since then, Europe increasingly moved away from command-and-control
regulation towards the implementation of new market-based instruments. In particular,
an unprecedented regulatory boom took place starting in 1996. Among the first and most
relevant policy interventions are the IPPC-Directive (1996/61), the Ambient Air Qual-
ity Directive (96/62), the Water Framework Directive (2000/60) and the NEC-Directive
(2001/81). They were followed by EU Emission Trading Scheme (2003/87/EC).
Today, European countries are committed to both the “Lisbon Agenda”, which stresses
increased competitiveness, economic growth and job creation, and to the “Gothenburg
Agenda”, which focuses on sustainable development. Integration of environmental pro-
tection into other EU policies is seen as a necessary step. The European Commission
argues that environmental policies and increased competitiveness are not mutually exclu-
sive, but can indeed strengthen one another (European Commission, 2010). Moreover, in
light of the economic crisis, the concept of “green recovery” (Edenhofer and Stern, 2009)
gained the center-stage.
This policy discourse is in line with the claims underlying the PH, as environmental
regulation can in fact result in enhanced competitiveness. However, this link has not been
proven and many worry that environmental regulation will place an excessive burden on
European industries, thereby stifling growth and damaging their competitiveness in an
increasingly global market place. Testing the link between environmental regulation
and competitiveness indicators is thus particularly relevant for Europe, where country-
specific dynamics is likely to play a big role within the EU. While environmental policy
initiatives are generally drafted at the European level, their implementation still lies
with the national governments, leading to big countries disparities with respect to the
stringency and implementation of such policies.
The goal of this paper is to extend the analysis of the PH using cross-country sector-
level data for European countries. We investigate the “strong” PH and assess whether
environmental regulation enhances or stifles sectoral innovation and productivity.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, unlike the few previous contri-
butions focusing on Europe (De Vries and Withagen, 2005, Johnstone, Hascic and Popp,
2010, Constantini and Crespi, 2008), we look at overall competitiveness and innovation,
that are the most relevant indicators for the “strong” PH. Previous studies mostly focused
on the “weak” PH and investigated the eﬀect of environmental regulation on energy ef-
ficiency and renewable energy innovation and performance. While generally concluding
that environmental innovation positively responds to environmental policy, these studies
do not consider the opportunity costs of environmental innovation, and cannot consider
the overall performance of diﬀerent EU manufacturing sectors.
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investigate the PH at the sectoral level. With respect to a country-level analysis we can
thus better capture the eﬀects of sector-specific environmental policies, on the one hand,
and the dynamics of competition that takes place within a sector, on the other hand. To
our knowledge, this is the first empirical analysis investigating the eﬀect of environmental
regulation on overall innovation and productivity at the sectoral level in the EU.
Third, we provide a first combined assessment of both innovation and competitiveness
impact of environmental regulation in the context of the PH using the European data.
Previous contributions focused either on assessing the impact of regulation on environ-
mental innovation (De Vries and Withagen, 2005, Johnstone, Hascic and Popp, 2010) or
on competitiveness (Constantini and Crespi, 2008, Mazzanti and Constantini, 2011), but
no empirical analysis focusing on Europe addresses both questions.
Finally, we use pollution abatement and control expenditures (PACE) at the sectoral
level as an environmental policy indicator, which has not been previously employed in
the investigation of the PH in Europe. PACE measure the consequence of government
environmental policies and regulations and include the flow of investment and current
expenditure directly aimed at pollution abatement and control. We address potential en-
dogeneity of PACE employing an instrumental variable approach. With the exception of
a few papers (De Vries and Withagen, 2005, Carrion-Flores and Innes, 2010, Kneller and
Manderson, 2012) the existing literature generally does not explicitly account for the en-
dogeneity problem of environmental policy variables in the PH context, whereas it might
lead to biased estimates of environmental regulation eﬀect on economic performance.1
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the literature on the
PH. Section 3 describes the competitiveness indicators used in our empirical application
while Section 4 presents the environmental regulation proxies. Section 5 presents de-
scriptive statistics while the empirical results on the link between environmental policy
and innovation and competitiveness are presented in Sections 6 and 7, respectively. Sec-
tion 8 provides robustness checks and Section 9 concludes and discusses further research
avenues.
2 Empirical Framework and Literature Review
The general framework guiding the empirical investigation of the PH in the literature can
be represented as follows:
C = f(ER,Z)(1)
1 Also in the other large literature on pollution heaven hypothesis that investigates the impact of envi-
ronmental regulation on manufacturing enterprises relocation only a few papers account for endogeneity
of environmental policy variables (Xing and Kolstad (2002), Ederington and Minier (2003) and Levinson
and Taylor (2003)).
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where C is a competitiveness indicator, ER is an environmental regulation stringency
variable and Z are other control variables.
The empirical literature investigating the link between environmental regulation and
competitiveness in the context of the PH is vast, but mostly focused on the US. With
respect to testing the innovation impact, Jaﬀe and Palmer (1997) studied how environ-
mental regulation stringency, proxied by PACE, aﬀects overall innovation in US man-
ufacturing sectors, proxied by either sector-level R&D expenditures or USPTO patents
applications. Their results point to a significant positive link between regulation and
R&D expenditures, whereas patents are not aﬀected by more stringent regulation.
Several subsequent studies addressed similar questions, mostly focusing on the “weak”
PH. Using plant- or sector-level US data they investigated the link between PACE and
environmental patents (see, for example, Lanjouw and Mody, 1995, Brunnermeier and
Cohen, 2003), generally concluding in favor of Porter’s idea that environmental regulation
spurs environmental innovation.
Conversely, the results of early studies on the “strong” PH in the US, such as Gray and
Shadbegian (1993, 2001), concluded that environmental regulation caused a productivity
slowdown. The authors attributed this to a displacement of “productive” investment
by environmental regulation. However, these studies investigated the impact of early
command-and-control policies in the US and not of market-based environmental policy,
as implied by the PH in its original form.
The sector-level analytical framework has been also applied to a handful of other
countries. Hamamoto (2006) investigated both innovation and productivity responses to
environmental regulation, proxied by PACE, in Japan. A similar framework and environ-
mental regulation proxy was used by Yang, Tseng and Chen (2012) for Taiwan, whereas
Lanoie, Patry and Lajeunesse (2008) focus on productivity eﬀects of environmental reg-
ulation in Canada. These contributions support the previous conclusions on the positive
eﬀect of environmental regulation, captured by PACE, on innovation and provide some
evidence of a positive impact of productivity.
Only a few studies test the eﬀect of stringent environmental regulation on competitive-
ness in Europe. De Vries and Withagen (2005) focus on SO2 reduction-related innovation
and test the “weak” PH at the country-level on a sample of twelve European countries
plus US and Canada. They use a number of environmental regulation proxies, such
as dummies indicating the adoption of international environmental protocols, an index
of Environmental Sensitivity Performance and SO2 emission levels. Johnstone, Hascic
and Popp (2010) focused on the “weak” PH in the renewable energy sector in twenty-
five OECD countries and investigated the relation between environmental regulation and
patents using various environmental policy adoption dummies. Constantini and Crespi
(2008) investigated the “strong” PH in the energy sector of seventeen European coun-
tries plus Japan, Canada and US. They focused on export eﬀects and employed several
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environmental policy indicators such as PACE, the share of environmental tax in total
government revenue, CO2 emissions intensities and a ratification dummy of the Kyoto
Protocol. Finally, Mazzanti and Constantini (2011) extended the investigation of the
environmental regualtion-export nexus to a broad range of manufacturing sectors in the
EU-15 using PACE and environmental tax share as policy variables.
There are a few limitations shared by the EU-based studies just mentioned, that
are worth noting. First, most of them, with the exception of Mazzanti and Constantini
(2011), are country-level analyses. As a result, they cannot account for heterogeneity
in the sectors’ responses to the regulation. Mazzanti and Constantini (2011) do have
a sectoral dimension, but the environmental regulation variables employed are country-
specific and do not exhibit sectoral variation.
Second, most studies testing the “weak” PH in Europe focus on how environmental
innovation (such as renewable energy or energy saving patents) responds to regulation.
They therefore do not test the eﬀect of stringent environmental regulation on total man-
ufacturing innovation and performance. Looking only at environmental innovation is
misleading, because the opportunity costs of environmental innovation are not accounted
for. In fact, environmental regulation could cause an increase of environmental inno-
vation, while (more valuable) innovation in other fields is not pursued due to budget
constraints. Therefore, looking at environmental innovation only is a partial way to test
the PH.
Third, European studies that focus on the “strong” PH mostly focus on export eﬀects
and do not test how productivity responds to stringent environmental policy. And this
is however the most controversial statement of the PH.
3 Competitiveness indicators
To test the validity of PH in European manufacturing sectors we use innovation and
productivity indicators as proxies of competitiveness. We describe each of them in de-
tail below, while we present the proxies for environmental policy stringency in the next
section.
3.1 Innovation proxies
To test the innovation impact of environmental regulation, we use both R&D expenditures
and patent statistics as measures of innovation activity. Both these proxies have been
widely used in the literature (Griliches, 1990). Industrial R&D expenditures represent
an input of the innovation production function, and measure the eﬀort of private firms in
pursuing innovation. Industrial R&D expenditures expressed in millions of euro at 2005
prices are taken from the OECD ANBERD database (OECD, 2012a). We complement
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this source with data from EUROSTAT (EUROSTAT, 2012a) for some missing countries
like Bulgaria, Sweden, Slovakia and the UK.2 The data are available for fifteen countries
over the period 1996-2009. 3
Conversely, patent statistics approximate the output of the knowledge production
function (see, for example, Joutz and Gardner, 1996, Johnstone et al., 2010). To a
certain extent, patent applications proxy for the productivity of R&D at the sectoral
level. Patent indicators suﬀer the major drawback of greatly diﬀering in quality and in
the magnitude of inventive output (Griliches, 1990). For this reason, we extract data
on patents applications by inventors to the EPO. EPO application data are superior
to data from national patent oﬃces, since the diﬀerence in costs between a national
application and an EPO application provides a quality threshold which eliminates low-
value inventions (OECD, 2009).
Patents statistics are extracted from the EUROSTAT Patent statistics database (EU-
ROSTAT, 2012b).4 Patent applications are assigned to a country according to the inven-
tor place of residence, using fractional counting if there are multiple inventors. Data on
sectoral patent applications are available for all EU countries for the period 1977-2009.
3.2 Productivity proxies
To test the productivity impact of environmental regulation, we use both Total Factor
Productivity (TFP) and Labor productivity (LP), which measure two distinct aspects of
sectoral productivity. TFP shows the time profile of how productively combined inputs
are used to generate gross output. Conceptually, TFP captures technical change. In
practice, it reflects also eﬃciency change, economies of scale, variations in capacity utili-
sation and measurement errors (OECD, 2001). Conversely, LP shows the time profile of
how productively labour is used to generate value added. Labour productivity changes
reflect the joint influence of changes in capital, as well as technical, organisational and
eﬃciency change within and between firms, the influence of economies of scale, varying
degrees of capacity utilisation and measurement errors. Following Inklaar and Timmer
(2008), we compute a Value Added-based LP measure, and a Gross Output-based TFP.
2 The R&D data from EUROSTAT are originally reported in current Euro, so we deflate them with
the 2005 GDP deflator.
3 A concern related to cross-country comparability of the R&D data from the OECD ANBERD must
be noted. R&D expenditures are classified by industry according to two diﬀerent types of criteria: by
main activity or by product field. For some countries R&D expenditures are calculated by main activity,
allocating all R&D expenditures according to the principal activity of a firm (though large firms could
have important R&D activities in secondary activities). On the contrary, for other countries, R&D data
are calculated by product field, disaggregating the R&D expenditures of diversified firms into diﬀerent
activities. Notwithstanding these diﬀerences, we use R&D proxy to provide comparable results with
previous literature.
4 EUROSTAT patent data is based on the EPO Worldwide Statistical Patent Database (PATSTAT).
The data excludes applications to national patent oﬃces of the Member States and Patent Cooperation
Treaty (PCT) applications made to the EPO that are still in the international phase.
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For both productivity measures we use data from the EU KLEMS database (EU
KLEMS, 2009) and the WIOD Socio-Economic Accounts database (WIOD, 2012). The
EU KLEMS database provides Gross Output, Value Added, inputs indicators for capital,
labor and intermediate inputs to construct TFP and LP measures. The EU KLEMS
database has the advantage of providing capital and labor inputs both in absolute and in
constant-quality indices terms. The latter are obtained by weighting the components of
each input by their marginal product and allow to account for the wide diﬀerences in the
productivity of various types of labour and assets over time. Using these input indices
a quality-adjusted TFP estimate that proxies for the disembodied technological progress
can be computed. However, the EU KLEMS allows to construct the quality-adjusted TFP
only in growth terms (due to the specific features of adjusted input indices). Moreover,
due to bad coverage of capital stock data we were able to construct the productivity
indicators in absolute terms only for eleven EU countries such as Czech Republic, Finland,
Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the
United Kingdom over the period 1997-2007. The productivity indicators in constant-
quality terms are available only for eight countries as the relevant data for Lithuania,
Poland and Portugal are missing.
Following the previous literature on the “strong” PH (Gray and Shadbegian, 1993,
2001; Lanoie, Patry and Lajeunesse, 2008, Hamamoto, 2006), we estimate productivity
equations both in levels and in growth rates, as there is no a priori guide to the use of
levels or growth rates. Given our data constraints, and in particular the availability of
quality-adjusted indexes only in growth rates terms, we use two diﬀerent TFP measures
in our empirical investigation. One is a“raw” TFP indicator that is not adjusted for the
inputs’ quality composition (available both in levels and growth for eleven countries of
the sample) and another is the quality-adjusted TFP growth indicator (available for eight
countries of the sample).
4 Environmental Policy Indicator
To proxy for environmental regulation we use Pollution abatement and control expen-
ditures (PACE) as a policy indicator. There has recently been a surge of interest in
measures of environmental policy stringency. A few alternatives have been proposed
(Brunel and Levinson, 2013; Botta and Kozluk, 2014; Nesta, Vona, and Nicolli, 2014):
none of them is ideal, as each indicator has got pros and cons both from a conceptual
and a practical perspective (Brunel and Levinson, 2013). The PACE indicator has not
been previously used in the context of sector-level studies of the PH in Europe and is
5 We provide the details on the construction of TFP and LP in Appendix A. Here, we only point to
some major issues linked with the computation of TFP which aﬀect our empirical choices.
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particularly well suited because, unlike other indicators (Nesta, Vona, and Nicolli, 2014),
it provides information on sector-specific responses to environmental policy.
PACE are purposeful activities aimed directly at the prevention, reduction and elim-
ination of pollution or nuisances arising as a residual of production processes or the
consumption of goods and services (OECD, 1996). PACE arise as the consequence of
government environmental policies and regulations and include the flow of investment
and current expenditure directly aimed at pollution abatement and control. PACE data
for the EU manufacturing sectors are available for the period 1997-2009.
To collect the data on these regulation variables we rely on two sources. When possible
we use data on nvironmental protection expendituresrom EUROSTAT (EUROSTAT,
2012c). We then fill missing observations with comparable data from various National
Statistics Oﬃces (of Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United
Kingdom). PACE is reported in million Euros. We use the sector-specific Producer Price
Index (PPI) to convert PACE nominal values into constant prices figures. There are
number of countries that do not report PACE data by sectors, namely Denmark, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Malta and Italy. Moreover, data for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,
Greece, and Latvia contain very few observations. We therefore exclude these countries
from the analysis. Thus, the PACE data we are going to use in our analysis refer to
seventeen European countries. It should be noted that also for these countries the data
have a number of time series gaps.
5 Descriptive Statistics
The period of analysis and the country sample have been selected on the basis of the data
availability of environmental regulation indicators. Our sample is an unbalanced sector-
level panel dataset covering 17 European countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom for the years 1997-2009. 6
The level of aggregation by industrial sectors varies across the five diﬀerent data
sources we use to collect our variables (EUROSTAT, EU KLEMS, WIOD, OECD STAN
and OECD ANBERD). We base our analysis on the sectoral classification of the PACE
variable, which includes nine macro sectors. The classification and the reference to the
the two-digit European NACE revision 1.1 sectoral classification is shown in Table 1.
Table 2 provides summary statistics of the main variables in the overall sample, while
Table 3 provides statistics by country.7
6 We exclude the other EU countries as they do not provide the required data on environmental
regulation.
7 We detected 24 outliers with unreasonably high PACE/VA ratio (several observations for Cyprus,
Estonia and Slovenia) and patent/VA ratio (several observations for Slovenia). These observations were
excluded from the sample.
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Tab. 1: Classification of Industrial Sectors
# Sector NACE
Rev.1.1
1 Food products, beverages and tobacco 15-16
2 Textiles and textile products; leather and leather
products
17-19
3 Wood and wood products 20
4 Pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and
printing
21-22
5 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 23
6 Chemicals; rubber and plastic products 24-25
7 Other non-metallic mineral products 26
8 Basic metals 27
9 Fabricated metal, Machinery and equipment, elec-
trical and optical equipment, transport equipment,
manufacturing n.e.c.
28-36
Source: International Standard Industrial Classification of all economic activities.
Tab. 2: Summary statistics (1997-2009)
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
R&D Total R&D expenditures Mln.constant euro 301.05 1113.81 0.00 9389.98
PAT Total patents application to EPO N patent application 100.24 393.37 0.00 3570.72
TFP Total Factor Productivity (based on GO) 1.19 0.44 -0.39 2.06
TFP growth Total Factor Productivity growth (based on GO) 0.01 0.04 -0.55 0.30
PACE PACE Mln.constant euro 91.34 176.03 0.00 1663.95
VA Value Added Mln.constant euro 4314.60 10933.69 0.00 112414.7
PATstock Patent stock N patent application 782.43 3131.01 0.00 29187.14
R&Dstock R&D stock Mln.constant euro 2307.59 7764.29 0.00 66205.59
GOVR&D Share of government R&D in total government exp. % 1.27 0.45 0.36 2.08
Export Export intensity % 0.63 1.19 0.05 15.69
Import Import intensity % 0.33 0.18 0.04 0.97
Death Death rate % 0.13 0.33 0.00 6.28
Birth Birth rate % 0.12 0.23 0.00 2.76
EI Energy intensity TOE per bln.constant euro 1.15 2.48 0.02 42.41
Source: own computations based on the EUROSTAT, the EU KLEM, the OECD STAN, the OECD ANBERD and the WIOD.
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Tab. 3: Summary statistics of the main variables by countries (1997-2009)
Country PACE/VA R&D/VA PAT/VA TFP TFP growth
Bulgaria 5.28 - 5.13 - -
Cyprus 3.00 - 11.40 - -
Czech Republic 4.37 1.87 6.89 1.02 0.02
Estonia 3.28 2.16 12.88 - -
Finland 2.79 4.85 25.49 1.27 0.02
Hungary 3.68 1.50 7.79 1.02 0.00
Lithuania 3.46 - 4.90 1.01 0.02
Netherlands 4.38 4.02 38.86 1.17 0.01
Norway 2.81 4.36 16.95 - -
Poland 3.78 0.42 2.21 1.03 -0.01
Portugal 2.88 1.19 4.01 0.98 -0.00
Romania 5.85 3.12 1.83 - -
Slovakia 3.62 2.06 4.11 - -
Slovenia 3.59 2.47 12.07 1.32 0.01
Spain 2.01 2.22 6.73 1.09 0.01
Sweden 5.14 - 30.84 1.23 0.01
United Kingdom 2.54 5.49 15.03 1.55 0.02
Total 3.63 2.86 12.73 1.19 0.01
Source: own computations based on the EUROSTAT, the EU KLEM, the OECD STAN,
the OECD ANBERD and the WIOD.
With regards to the competitiveness indicators, there are striking diﬀerence between
new and old Member States. In particular, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Nether-
lands, Norway, Sweden and the UK have patent and R&D intensities which exceed several
time those of other countries. The level of TFP is highest in Finland, Slovenia, Sweden
and the UK. TFP growth is highest in the Czech Republic, Finland, Lithuania and the
UK, whereas it is negative in Poland and Portugal. Concerning environmental expendi-
tures an average share of PACE in the final sample makes 3.6 percent in Value Added and
0.9 percent in Gross Output. Finland, Portugal, Norway, Spain and the UK are behind
the other countries in terms of share of environmental expenditures in VA (that ranges
between 2-3 percent). We can also observe larger environmental expenditures in new
Member States than in old Member States over the sample period, as the former needed
to catch up with European legislative requirements in a relatively short period of time
(in new Member States PACE/VA ranges between 4-6 percent). Among the old Member
States Sweden and the Netherlands have the highest expenditures for compliance with
environmental regulation (PACE/VA ranges between 4-5 percent).
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics by sector. Some sectors, such as sector 5 “Coke,
refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel”, 6 “Chemicals; rubber and plastic products”
and 9 “Machinery and equipment”, have patent and R&D intensities which are twice
the average. Their patent intensity ranges (19-36 patents per billion of euro against an
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Tab. 4: Summary statistics of the main variables by sectors (1997-2009)
Sector PACE/VA R&D/VA PAT/VA TFP TFP growth
1 2.60 1.05 4.15 1.06 0.01
2 1.52 1.25 4.56 1.12 0.01
3 2.38 0.48 0.90 1.21 0.01
4 3.25 0.60 2.17 1.31 0.01
5 9.49 4.88 19.17 0.29 0.01
6 4.03 8.17 36.97 1.44 0.01
7 3.45 0.99 7.42 1.67 0.02
8 6.08 1.90 11.93 1.40 0.01
9 1.16 5.99 29.10 1.04 0.01
Total 3.63 2.86 12.73 1.19 0.01
Source: own computations based on the EUROSTAT, the EU KLEM,
the OECD STAN, the OECD ANBERD and the WIOD.
average value of 13 patents per billion of euro and 4.9-8.2 percent R&D intensity versus
an average value of 2.9 percent). The highest TFP in terms of level is observed in sectors
6 “Chemicals; rubber and plastic products”, 7 “Other non-metallic mineral products”
and 8 “Basic metals”. With regards to PACE, we observe sizeable diﬀerences between
the sectors 5 “Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel”, 6 “Chemicals; rubber
and plastic products” and 8 “Basic metals” that spend more on pollution abatement and
control activities than an average European sector (their shares of PACE in VA are 9.5
percent, 4.0 percent and 6,1 percent, respectively, against an average share of 3.6 percent).
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6 Environmental regulation and innovation activity
We begin our empirical analysis by testing the relations between environmental regulation
and innovative activity, while empirical analysis the impact of environmental regulation
on productivity is presented in section 7.
6.1 Empirical strategy
Our starting point is an equation similar the one used in the paper of Jaﬀe and Palmer
(1997) extended for multi-country sector-level analysis. The log-log specification relating
innovation to environmental policy proxies reads as follows:
(2) ln INNOijt =  1 lnERijt q +   lnXijt 1 + ↵ij + µt + ✏ijt
Where INNOijt is either total R&D expenditures (R&D) or total patent applications
(PAT) in country i sector j and time t. Environmental regulation (ER) is PACE 8. Equa-
tion (2) controls for both unobserved and observed sector-country specific heterogeneity.
The main diﬀerence between the regressions with the R&D and the PAT indicators lie in
the lag structure considered in the estimation for ER, as discussed in detail below. Due
to the data availability R&D and patent equations are estimated for the period 1998-2009
and 1997-2009, respectively.
To deal with factors that could aﬀect a sectoral innovation performance we include
the vector of sector- and national-level covariates (X). Sector-level covariates include
Value Added (VA), knowledge stock (INNOstock), import penetration (Import), export
intensity (Export), enterprises birth rate (Birth) and death rate (Death). Country-level
covariates include public support to private R&D (GOVR&D).
We account for the impact of public support to private R&D using the share of R&D
appropriations in total government expenditures. The data comes from the GBAORD
OECD database (OECD, 2012a) but has the disadvantage of being reported only at the
aggregate country level with no sectoral detail.
Among the determinants of innovation, a prominent role is played by technology-
push factors, as argued by Schumpeter (1943). Thus, on the supply side we add a
knowledge stock variable (INNOstock) capturing previous innovation experience, which
has a positive influence on the innovation capacity of a given country because innovators
can “stand on the shoulders of the giants” (Caballero and Jaﬀe, 1993). Firms/industries
which exhibit greater past investment in technological development are also more likely
8 Alternatively, we can regress a percentage share of R&D in VA or a share of PAT in VA on a PACE
share in VA. However, a measurement error in value added could cause equation 2 to exhibit spurious
correlation. Thus, we estimate the equation in ratio form as a Robustness check in section 7.4. The
results on PACE are very similar to those reported here.
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to engage in innovative practices in the future (Baumol, 2002). The stock is calculated
using the perpetual inventory method (Verdolini and Galeotti, 2011) as follows:
(3) INNOstockijt = INNOijt + (1   )INNOstockijt 1
where   is the decay rate, set at a value of 0.1 as suggested by Keller (2002) and the
initial innovation stock is calculated as follows:
(4) INNOstockijt0 =
INNOijt0
(  + g¯ij)
In equation (4) we use t0 is the initial year of stock calculation and g¯ij is the sector-
country specific average innovation growth of the three years preceding t0. In the case of
the R&D equation the knowledge stock is based on private sectoral R&D and t0 = 1998
(as the earlier data are not available). In the patent equation the stock is computed using
sectoral patent applications and t0 = 1993.
We include import penetration (Import) as a proxy of external competition. Many
studies following Schumpeter (Schumpeter, 1943) postulate a positive influence of mar-
ket concentration on innovation. Schumpeter argued that market concentration reduces
market uncertainty and motivates firms to invest in R&D. Other authors argue the op-
posite, claiming that concentration leads to inertia and hinders innovation due to lacking
competitive pressure (Levin et al.,1985). Therefore, the sign associated with the eﬀect of
external competition on innovation is ambiguous. The import penetration is calculated
as the ratio of import over the sum of domestic and import production. The data for
sector level import intensities are taken from the WIOD Input output database (WIOD,
2012).
To control for the eﬀect of sector’s structural change due to enterprises creations,
deaths or relocations on innovation intensity we incorporate enterprises birth (Birth)
rate and deaths rates (Death) indicators in the equation. This structural changes might
also aﬀect environmental costs intensity. In particular, if enterprises shutdown or relocate
due to strict environmental policy, it is likely that PACE intensity decreases as the most
burden firms leave the market. The birth rate is defined as number of new enterprises
over total enterprises, whereas the death rate is a number of death enterprises over total
enterprises.9 The data are obtained from EUROSTAT Detailed enterprise statistics on
manufacturing subsections (EUROSTAT, 2012a).
We supplement the vector of controls with export intensity (Export) which controls
9 Enterprises created or closed solely as a result of e.g. restructuring, merger or break-up are not
included in this data. Due to the original classification of the database “Fabricated metal” is included in
sector 8, rather than in sector 9 (EUROSTAT, 2012a).
6 Environmental regulation and innovation activity 14
for a sector’s participation in foreign trade. If foreign markets are more responsive to va-
riety changes, an increase in export intensity could lead to more R&D spending (Brunner-
meier and Cohen, 2003). Moreover, strong competition abroad can encourage innovation,
especially if a regulated firm is competing with firms in countries with less stringent envi-
ronmental regulations and lower wages (Kneller and Manderson, 2012). Export intensity
is calculated as the ratio of exports over domestic production, based on data drawn from
the WIOD (2012).10
Finally, as larger industries are likely to have greater absolute levels of PACE, and
are also more likely to have the resources necessary to meet the fixed costs, and bear the
risks, involved with undertaking investments in innovation we include VA as a scaling
variable.
The control variables summarised by X are lagged once to avoid simultaneity prob-
lems with innovation activity. Besides production (or VA) to innovation, causality could
run in the opposite direction accounting for a possible boost of production scale due to
successful innovation. Similarly, two-way causation could exist between innovation and
exporting: innovation could positively aﬀect exports through induced competitiveness
on international markets. Finally, bidirectional causation could arise between innovation
and external competition, as innovation performance of local producers could aﬀect the
degree of import penetration.
To test the dynamic eﬀect of environmental regulation on innovation stressed by
many authors (for example, Jaﬀe and Palmer, 1997; Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003;
Hamamoto, 2006) we incorporate a lag structure for environmental regulation variables.
It is reasonable to assume that firms immediately react to the introduction of regulation,
and get involved into R&D. However, we can also assume that in some cases it takes time
to mobilize the resources necessary for R&D investments. Therefore, in the equation
where R&D is used as a dependent variable, we test both contemporaneous, one and two
years lagged eﬀects of the environmental policy due to diﬀerent assumption about reaction
time of firm to environmental regulation. The choice of the number of lags is based on
previous findings which show that the policy variable is most significant with lags between
zero and two years (for example, see Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003, Hamamoto, 2006
and Johnstone et al., 2010).
Given the diﬀerent nature of the R&D and patent data, we assume a diﬀerent lag
structure in R&D and patent equations. Specifically, we assume that the whole innovation
process from R&D investment to patent application takes time and that environmental
10 Due to the original classification of the WIOD database “Fabricated metal” is included in sector 8,
rather than in sector 9. We correct values associated with sectors 8 and 9 by applying Value Added
share of “Fabricated metal” in aggregated metal sector from the EU KLEMS (March 2008 Release, which
reports these two sub-sectors separately). As we could not provide these corrections for countries not
reported by EU KLEMS such as Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Lithuania and Estonia export and import
data for sectors 8 and 9 for these two countries are missing.
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policy-induced innovations could be translated into patents with at least one (or more)
year lag period. Thus, we include from one to three years lagged regulation variable in the
patent equation. Equation (2) includes country-sector specific eﬀects ↵ij, which absorb
the impact of sector-specific time-invariant characteristics of innovation ability and are
also likely to be correlated with PACE and time eﬀects µt. 11
A final issue is the treatment of country-sector eﬀects, whether fixed Eﬀect (FE) or
random (RE). The RE model is consistent only if country-sector specific eﬀects are uncor-
related with the covariates, which is unlikely to occur when there are omitted variables.
The FE model, instead, is required in the presence of such correlation. However, the
FE is less desirable, in that it uses only within variation of the data, that leads to less
eﬃcient estimation. The Hausman test allows for discrimination between the two models.
Since in our context unobservable factors, that are constant over time but vary across
countries and sectors, can aﬀect innovation activity and are also likely to be correlated
with the other regressors, we estimate the innovations models using a FE estimator. We
validate this choice with the Hausman test: the significance of the statistics associated
to the Hausman test confirms that the FE model is to be preferred to the RE model.
It is important to keep in mind that due to data availability issues we carry out
estimations of R&D equations on a smaller country sample than the patent equation.
In particular, we loose observations on three countries such as Lithuania, Estonia and
Cyprus. Therefore, the results of two innovation equations are not directly comparable.
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6.2 Estimation results
Tables 5 and 6 report the estimation of R&D and patent eﬀect of environmental regu-
lation, respectively. Columns 1-3 and Columns 4-6 of Table 5 report the results of an
immediate and one-year lagged PACE eﬀect on R&D, respectively. Columns 1-3 and
Columns 4-6 of Table 6 display the results of one- and two-years lagged PACE eﬀect
on patents. As a starting point, in Columns 1 and 4 of both Tables we provide the
estimates for the baseline specification similar to Jaﬀe and Palmer, 1997. The baseline
specification is then augmented to control for the knowledge stock, export and import
intensity (Columns 2 and 5), and enterprises‘ birth and death rates (Column 3 and 6).
The coeﬃcients associated with immediate and one-year lagged impact of environmental
11 A possible alternative to using country-sector specific fixed eﬀects would be to control for country-
specific eﬀects ↵i and sector-specific eﬀects ↵j separately, but it would be less appropriate in our case.
Country-sector specific fixed eﬀects capture the omitted determinants of innovation activity that are
likely to aﬀect environment regulation and vary within the same sector across countries. For example,
market concentration of local producers could aﬀect cost eﬃciency, and therefore PACE, as well as
determine propensity to R&D. Inclusion of ↵ij thus allows to correct for omitted-variable bias, assuming
these factors do not vary over time.
12 Results available from the authors upon request show that the findings are robust to use of homo-
geneous samples.
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Tab. 5: R&D eﬀect of environmental regulation: FE estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PACE 0.043 0.006 0.033 - - -
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
1Y Lagged PACE - - - -0.021 -0.055 -0.045
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Lagged VA 0.042 0.070* 0.013 0.084 0.140 0.031
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13)
Lagged GOVR&D 0.043 0.275* 0.311** -0.076 0.120 0.132
(0.18) (0.15) (0.14) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17)
Lagged R&D stock - 0.466** 0.654*** - 0.609*** 0.633***
(0.18) (0.21) (0.18) (0.19)
Lagged Export - 0.433** 0.434* - 0.404** 0.519***
(0.18) (0.22) (0.15) (0.18)
Lagged Import - -0.095 -0.320 - -0.472*** -0.633*
(0.23) (0.22) (0.17) (0.35)
Lagged Death rate - - 1.806** - - 1.938***
(0.79) (0.68)
Lagged Birth rate - - -1.064 - - -0.898
(0.82) (0.70)
F 1.32* 3.02*** 5.61*** 1.45** 4.22*** 8.46***
Within R-squared 0.05 0.14 0.22 0.05 0.19 0.26
Observations 750 666 515 694 612 512
N.Country-sector 129 112 105 129 111 104
Note: Coeﬃcient estimates from FE. Country-year fixed eﬀects and full set of time
dummies included in all models. All the variables are in logs. Robust standard errors
(clustered on the sector-country unit) in parentheses.* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
The data on Export, Import, Death and Birth are not complete, therefore
we loose some obs. when adding these var. in the regressions.
regulation on R&D are insignificant in all the specifications. The results available from
the authors upon request show that there is no link between environmental regulation
with the lags beyond the two years and R&D. However, judging from the results of Table
6 the one- and two-years lagged patent eﬀect of environmental regulation are positive and
significant. Depending on the specification, a 10 percent increase of PACE is associated
with a 0,3-0,9 percent increase in number of patent applications. The one-year eﬀect is
robust to adding and omitting various controls such as the knowledge stock, export and
import intensity, enterprisesirth and death rates. However, the two-years positive eﬀect
vanishes when we control for enterprise demographic factors.
Taking together the results of R&D and patent equations, we conclude that environ-
mental regulation has not eﬀect on overall R&D, but increases number of patents in the
short- and the medium-run. Therefore, there is no evidence that induced innovations
come at opportunity costs for a firm.
The coeﬃcients associated with other controls used in the regressions are in line with
expectations. For instance, the positive coeﬃcients associated with the knowledge stock
variables confirm the results from a rich literature pointing to the “standing on the shoul-
der of the giants” ’ eﬀect (Caballero and Jaﬀe, 1993). Participation in international trade
has a positive eﬀect on sectoral R&D, confirming positive learning-by-exporting eﬀects.
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Tab. 6: PATENT eﬀect of environmental regulation: FE estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1Y Lagged PACE 0.086*** 0.075*** 0.030** - - -
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
2Y Lagged PACE - - - 0.096*** 0.079*** 0.002
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Lagged VA 0.061 0.016 -0.045 -0.032 -0.064*** -0.045
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Lagged GOVR&D 0.323*** 0.178* -0.073 0.286*** 0.079 -0.086
(0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.11) (0.12) (0.08)
Lagged PATstock - 0.521*** 0.509*** - 0.518*** 0.487***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Lagged Export - -0.012 0.050 - -0.025 0.105
(0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
Lagged Import - -0.296** -0.277** - -0.224* -0.385***
(0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15)
Lagged Death rate - - 0.024 - - 0.129
(0.21) (0.26)
Lagged Birth rate - - 0.275* - - 0.483*
(0.16) (0.29)
F 6.89*** 9.73*** 6.40*** 10.32*** 10.01*** 6.70***
Within R-squared 0.37 0.51 0.39 0.39 0.51 0.35
Observations 913 802 639 883 776 587
N.Country-sector 153 136 125 151 135 126
Note: See footnotes of Table 5
External competition, measured by import intensity, has a negative and significant im-
pact both on R&D and patent, confirming the Schumpetrian view of a negative influence
of market pressure on innovation. Closure of enterprises, measured by death rate, results
in increased R&D intensity. Diﬀerently, patent intensity is positively aﬀected by opening
of new enterprises. In several specifications the public support of private R&D, measured
by the share of public R&D in government budget, has positive eﬀect on private R&D
and patent behaviour.
6.3 Endogeneity
Even with all the controls included in the innovation equation, confounding trends in
sector-level innovation performance and unmeasured omitted factors that could aﬀect
PACE are still reason for concern. Substantively, the endogeneity of the PACE could
cause both downward and upward bias in the estimation of PACE eﬀects.
The assumption that omitted common determinants of cost of regulation (PACE) and
innovation are time-invariant could be too strong, as these factors are likely to change in
time. If this assumption is relaxed, we could not capture these factors with the country-
sector fixed eﬀects ↵ij.
Endogeneity of PACE could also arise in the innovation equation because of reverse
causality from innovation to environmental costs. In fact, not only PACE could aﬀect
innovation, but also regulation-induced innovation that is designed to lower costs of com-
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pliance with regulation will aﬀect PACE (Carrion-Flores and Innes, 2010; Kneller and
Manderson, 2012). This two-way relation could bias downward the coeﬃcient of PACE.
Finally, PACE estimates could be biased due to a measurement error problem. PACE
is self-reported by firms that have diﬃculties to identify part of expenditures associated
with regulatory compliance in their total expenditures. It could therefore be reported
with errors. Moreover, PACE is not adjusted to take into account transfers or subsidies.
At the same time some Member Countries use subsidies and refund schemes to protect
producers from any negative eﬀect on competitiveness arising from increases in input
costs ( European Commission 2010).
To overcome potential endogeneity issues we adopt an instrumental variable (IV) ap-
proach. PACE is instrumented with a vector of instruments Z that includes the average
share of PACE intensity for eight adjacent sectors of the same country excluding the cur-
rent sector (PACE/V A j) and PACE/V A j interacted with pre-sample sectoral energy-
intensity (year 1996), EIpresample.13 In fact, there is a strong correlation between environ-
mental policies applied to diﬀerent sectors within one country; a sector’s PACE intensity
is therefore strongly correlated with adjacent sectors’ PACE intensity within a country.
We complement PACE/V A j interacted with pre-sample sectoral energy-intensity as
regimes of environmental regulation of energy intensity sectors could diﬀer from those
of less intensive sectors within the same country, therefore environmental policies of en-
ergy intensive sectors could stand out from policies of adjacent sectors. EI is defined as
emission-relevant energy use (in tonne of oil equivalent, TOE) over VA. Emission-relevant
energy use by sector is the gross energy use excluding non-energy use (e.g. asphalt for
road building) and the input for transformation (e.g. crude oil transformed into refined
products) of energy commodities, obtained from the WIOD Environmental Accounts
database (WIOD, 2012).14 The identification assumption for all the instruments is that
conditional on sectoral Value Added, innovation stock, government R&D support, im-
port intensity, export intensity, enterprises demographic indicators, country-sector fixed
eﬀects and time eﬀects, these instruments are strong predictors of sectoral level PACE,
but are not correlated with unobserved factors impacting innovation.
We estimate the eﬀect of environmental costs on innovation performance using 2SLS
and optimal IV-GMM estimators in the just identifed and the over identified equations,
respectively. We also apply limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) which has
better small sample properties than 2SLS and optimal IV-GMM estimators with weak in-
13 Using PACE/V A j we loose several observations for Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia and the
UK when the PACE data across the sectors are not complete. Due to the nature of EIpresample that
is time invariant, we could not include it independently in the first stage FE regression as it will be
canceled out.
14 We have minor diﬀerences in energy intensity classification comparing to the innovation indicators
and PACE. Due to the original classification of the WIOD database “Fabricated metal” is included in
the sector 8, rather than in the sector 9. Concerning the sample size, we loose observations on Norway
when using EI as an instrument, due to the lack of sector-level data on energy use.
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Tab. 7: R&D eﬀect of environmental regulation: First stage results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PACE_V A j 0.209*** 0.284*** 0.204*** 0.268*** - - - - -
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Lagged PACE_V A j - - - - 0.359*** 0.363*** 0.374*** 0.360*** 0.360***
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
PACE/V A j*EIpre - -0.192** - -0.244** - - - - -
(0.09) (0.11)
Lagged PACE/V A j*EIpre - - - - - -0.342*** - -0.334** -0.334**
(0.09) (0.15) (0.15)
Lagged VA 0.090** 0.164* 0.089** 0.171* 0.103 0.099 0.112 0.103 0.103
(0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Lagged GOVR&D -0.238 -0.257 -0.281 -0.294 -0.340 -0.330 -0.387* -0.371 -0.371
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Lagged R&Dstock 0.220* 0.197 0.244* 0.226 0.175 0.206 0.171 0.217 0.217
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Lagged Export - - 0.025 -0.010 - - -0.118 -0.107 -0.107
(0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
Lagged Import - - -0.068 -0.207 - - -0.298 -0.240 -0.240
(0.27) (0.28) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34)
Lagged Death rate - - -0.286 -0.450 - - -2.392*** -2.448*** -2.448***
(0.53) (0.51) (0.88) (0.86) (0.86)
Lagged Birth rate - - -0.291 0.036 - - 1.536* 1.584* 1.584*
(0.66) (0.66) (0.89) (0.89) (0.89)
F-stat 5.50*** 7.97*** 4.95*** 7.73*** 14.78*** 16.73*** 14.08*** 14.53*** 14.53***
Within R-sq 0.19 0.23 0.08 0.09 0.20 0.23 0.14 0.15 0.15
C-test of endog.(P value) 0.033 0.342 0.089 0.486 0.029 0.002 0.019 0.000 0.013
Weak-ID test (F instruments) 10.82 13.51 9.17 12.94 13.18 15.99 13.48 12.53 12.53
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical 8.96 11.59 8.96 11.59 8.96 11.59 8.96 11.59 8.68
( val 15% max IV size)
Partial R-squared 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.09
AR Weak-ID-robust F (P value) 0.05 0.27 0.10 0.22 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
AR Weak-ID-robust Chi2 (P value) 0.04 0.25 0.09 0.20 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Over-ID test (P value J-statistic) 0.28 0.25 0.65 0.27 0.28
Observations 641 577 498 480 608 574 509 492 492
N.Country-sector 114 107 108 102 111 104 104 98 98
Note: Coeﬃcient estimates from 2SLS in Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, IV-GMM in Columns 2, 4, 6, 8 and LIML in Column 9.
Country-year fixed eﬀects full and set of time dummies included in all models. All the variables are in logs. Robust standard errors
(clustered on the sector-country unit) in parentheses.* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
The data on PACE/V A j and EI are not complete, therefore we loose some obs. in the IV specifications.
However, we checked that change of sign in IV specifications is not caused by sample reduction, but is due to introduction of IV.
struments (Cameroon and Trevedi, 2010). The first stage attempts to isolate the portion
of variation in PACE intensity that is attributable to exogenous environmental expen-
ditures. Predicted PACE from the instruments ignores structural concerns and two-way
causality problems that make actual sectoral PACE intensity endogenous. We could be
relatively confident that our results reflect causal eﬀects of environmental costs on sec-
toral innovation performance. Firstly, using a panel data framework we control for sector-
and country-specific unobserved characteristics. Moreover, we also control for a level of
technological advancements and structural changes within a sector that are commonly
accused to generate PACE endogeneity if not explicitly controlled for in a sector-level
regulation-innovation model. As well, because we have two instruments for one endoge-
nous variable, we are able to test the joint validity of these instruments, and to show that
they pass an over identification test.
Tables 7 and 9 report the results of the first-stage regression between PACE and
the set of instruments in the R&D and patent equations, respectively. In both equa-
tions the instruments positively correlate with the endogenous PACE. The coeﬃcient
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Tab. 8: R&D eﬀect of environmental regulation: Second stage results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Instrumented PACE -0.513* -0.157 -0.448 -0.125 - - - - -
(0.31) (0.19) (0.32) (0.20)
Instrumented 1Y Lag. PACE - - - - -0.277** -0.318*** -0.403** -0.475*** -0.542**
(0.12) (0.11) (0.17) (0.18) (0.21)
Lagged VA 0.116* 0.067 0.123** 0.093 0.135 0.143 0.156 0.190** 0.163
(0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Lagged GOVR&D -0.129 -0.077 -0.040 0.034 -0.170 -0.177 -0.086 -0.077 -0.131
(0.20) (0.16) (0.21) (0.15) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.20) (0.21)
Lagged R&Dstock 0.746*** 0.631*** 0.674*** 0.563*** 0.768*** 0.786*** 0.665*** 0.693*** 0.696***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
Lagged Export - - 0.413** 0.397** - - 0.348** 0.291** 0.301**
(0.16) (0.17) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Lagged Import - - -0.161 -0.168 - - -0.494*** -0.500*** -0.543***
(0.22) (0.25) (0.17) (0.19) (0.20)
Lagged Death rate - - 1.589 -0.337 - - -0.228 -0.438 -0.666
(9.12) (1.98) (0.68) (0.72) (0.79)
Lagged Birth rate - - 0.848 -0.372 - - 0.141 0.254 0.418
(8.52) (0.90) (0.49) (0.51) (0.56)
Observations 641 577 498 480 608 574 509 492 492
N.Country-sector 114 107 108 102 111 104 104 98 98
Note: See footnotes of Table 7
of PACE/V A j and its interaction with the EIpresample are strongly significant. The
specification tests reported at the bottom of the tables confirm relevance and validity of
the instruments. The Kleibergen-Paap test for weak identification‘s F-statistics exceed a
widely used rule of thumb equals to 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997) with the exception of
specification (3) of Table 7, thus not rejecting the joint significance of excluded restric-
tions in the first-stage regression. Moreover, F-statistics are above the reported Stock
and Yogo (2005) weak ID test critical value (for 10-15% relative IV bias toleration) across
diﬀerent specifications of R&D and patent equations, eliminating the concern that the
excluded instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors (Stock et al.
2002; Stock and Yogo 2005). Another weak-instrument diagnostics that we use is Shea’s
partial R2 between PACE and the excluded instruments after controlling for the included
instruments in the first-stage regression.The high value in the patent equation indicates
that the endogenous regressor is not weakly identified. In the R&D equation the value
of partial R2 is rather low suggesting some need for caution.
The validity of the instruments are tested with Hansen J-test. As the reported p-
values of Hansen J-test are greater than 0.05 in all the models, we do not reject the joint
null hypothesis that the instruments are valid, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term, and
conclude that over identifying restriction is valid. The weak-instrument robust Anderson-
Rubin (1949) test statistics always reject the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients of the
one-year lagged PACE in the structural equation are equal to zero, and, in addition, that
the overidentifying restrictions are valid. Finally, the C-test rejects the null hypothesis
that the the one-year lagged PACE can actually be treated as exogenous in the R&D
equation (P value is lower than 0.05). However, exogeneity of one-year PACE is not
rejected in the patent equation.
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Tab. 9: PATENT eﬀect of environmental regulation: First stage results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1Y Lag. PACE_V A j 0.446*** 0.499*** 0.689*** 0.673*** - - - - -
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
2Y Lag.PACE_V A j - - - - 0.472*** 0.477*** 0.575*** 0.486*** 0.486***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
1Y Lag. PACE/V A j*EIpre - -0.101*** - -0.166* - - - - -
(0.03) (0.10)
2Y Lag. PACE/V A j*EIpre - - - - - -0.130** - -0.547*** -0.547***
(0.06) (0.16) (0.16)
Lagged VA 0.133 0.151* 0.180* 0.176* 0.073 0.086 0.404*** 0.439*** 0.439***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Lagged GOVR&D -0.123 -0.130 -0.292 -0.277 -0.066 -0.048 -0.198 -0.221 -0.221
(0.15) (0.16) (0.21) (0.22) (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18)
Lagged PATstock 0.360** 0.352** 0.378** 0.390** 0.402** 0.397** 0.406* 0.415* 0.415*
(0.16) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Lagged Export - - -0.467*** -0.468** - - -0.351* -0.289 -0.289
(0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Lagged Import - - 0.486 0.491 - - 0.888** 0.847** 0.847**
(0.30) (0.31) (0.38) (0.35) (0.35)
Lagged Death rate - - -0.637 -0.646 - - -0.765* -0.901** -0.901**
(0.49) (0.50) (0.45) (0.42) (0.42)
Lagged Birth rate - - 0.427 0.467 - - -0.062 0.204 0.204
(0.43) (0.42) (0.48) (0.40) (0.40)
F-stat 14.42*** 15.34*** 10.76*** 11.00*** 7.41*** 7.96*** 8.67*** 9.10*** 9.10***
Within R-sq 0.26 0.29 0.36 0.37 0.24 0.26 0.32 0.36 0.36
C-test of endog.(P value) 0.39 0.26 0.08 0.13 0.02 0.08 0.23 0.15 0.12
F instruments 43.58 30.55 110.75 60.10 41.04 24.83 47.11 33.87 33.87
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical 16.38 19.93 16.38 19.93 16.38 19.93 16.38 19.93 19.93
( val 10% max IV size)
Partial R-squared 0.15 0.18 0.27 0.28 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.25 0.25
P value Anderson-Rubin F-test 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
P value Anderson-Rubin chi-sq test 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
P value J-statistic 0.12 0.48 0.14 0.06 0.06
Observations 828 788 609 592 789 756 613 523 523
N.Country-sector 144 137 122 116 142 135 121 106 106
Note: Coeﬃcient estimates from 2SLS in Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, IV-GMM in Columns 2, 4, 6, 8 and LIML in Column 9.
Country-year fixed eﬀects full and set of time dummies included in all models. All the variables are in logs. Robust standard errors
(clustered on the sector-country unit) in parentheses.* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
The data on PACE/V A j and EI are not complete, therefore we loose some obs. in the IV specifications.
Tab. 10: PATENT eﬀect of environmental regulation: Second stage results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Instrumented 1Y Lag. PACE 0.118** 0.124** 0.073** 0.063** - - - - -
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Instrumented 2Y Lag. PACE - - - - 0.173*** 0.152*** -0.045 -0.042 -0.054*
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Lagged VA 0.009 0.004 -0.052 -0.051 -0.075*** -0.073*** -0.008 -0.010 0.021
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Lagged GOVR&D 0.187** 0.190** -0.073 -0.082 0.051 0.049 -0.156** -0.112* -0.129*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Lagged PATstock 0.557*** 0.548*** 0.528*** 0.535*** 0.533*** 0.531*** 0.537*** 0.518*** 0.556***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Lagged Export -0.011 0.014 0.079 0.062 -0.057 -0.058 0.083 0.070 0.083
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Lagged Import -0.334*** -0.369*** -0.345*** -0.346*** -0.264** -0.311*** -0.365*** -0.418*** -0.368***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
Lagged Death rate - - -0.028 -0.036 - - 0.108 -0.052 0.058
(0.16) (0.15) (0.23) (0.18) (0.18)
Lagged Birth rate - - 0.291* 0.307* - - 0.397 0.580** 0.261
(0.17) (0.17) (0.26) (0.26) (0.18)
Observations 828 788 609 592 789 756 613 523 523
N.Country-sector 144 137 122 116 142 135 121 106 106
Note: See footnotes to Table 9
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Table 8 reports the second-stage estimation results of the R&D equation controlling
for potential edogeneity of the PACE variable. Columns 1-4 and 5-9 correspond to the
specifications with current and one-year lagged PACE, respectively. The estimates across
the specifications noticeably diﬀer from those obtained from the FE regressions. Firstly,
controlling for endogeneity changes the interpretation of the lagged impact of PACE on
R&D. According to the results of Table 8 the environmental regulation eﬀect becomes
negative and significant. Depending on the specification, increasing regulation compliance
expenditure by 10 percent leads to 3-5 percent decrease of overall R&D. The eﬀect of
R&D thus is overestimated when not accounting for endogeneity. The negative and
significant coeﬃcients of one-year lagged PACE are robust to using LIML estimator.
The results available from the authors upon request show that environmental regulation
proxied by PACE does not aﬀect R&D after one-year period. Also the current PACE
eﬀect is statistically not diﬀerent from zero with the exception of Column 1 where it is
negative and significant.
The results of the patent equation using one- and two-years lagged PACE variables are
reported in Table 10. The one-year lagged PACE remains positive and strongly significant
with the similar magnitude to the FE estimation. Other things equal, an additional 10
percent of regulation compliance expenditure increases number of patent applications by
approximately 0.8 percent in the one-year period. However, when controling for PACE
endogeneity the two-years lagged eﬀect of environmental regulation on patent becomes
insignificant. We omit for brevity the estimation results of R&D and patent equations
with PACE variable included beyond the one-year lag and the two-years lag period,
respectively, as they don’t confirm the regulation eﬀect. 15 With the exception of public
R&D the eﬀects of the other control variables are robust to change from the FE to IV
estimations in both. 16
Taking together the results of R&D and patent equations, we conclude that environ-
mental regulation lead to an increase of patent applications in the short-run. The firms
promptly react to environmental regulation with patents. We believe that these results
could be driven by increased incentives of manufacturing firms for patent protection of
green innovations. Under a stringent environmental regulation patenting of such projects
is likely to give a firm a first-mover competitive advantages. However, by committing
resources to comply with regulation, the firm reduces overall R&D expenditure. The
IV results of both innovation equations highlight the upward bias of the lagged PACE
coeﬃcients in the FE estimation.
Our results on R&D eﬀect are thus not in line with those of earlier findings of Jaﬀe and
Palmer, 1997 for the U.S. and Hamamoto, 2006 for Japan, where more PACE are found
15 The results are available from the authors upon request.
16 Surprisingly, the eﬀect of public R&D becomes negative in several specifications of the patent equa-
tion. One possible explanation of this result is that the public R&D data lacks sectoral variation and
thus does not always allow to capture a public R&D impact in the sectoral level analysis.
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to bring about significant R&D enhancement eﬀects both in the short- and the medium-
term. As regards to patents, the number of previous findings state that environmental
regulation positively impacts overall environmental patents at the sector-level in the U.S
(Brunnermeier and Cohen, 1998) and specific environmental patents in OECD countries
(Vries and Withagen, 2005; Popp, 2006; Johnstone, Hasic and Popp, 2008). Diﬀerently
from these authors, we show on the sample of European countries that environmental
regulation results in enhancement of overall patent activity (and not only environmental
patents).
7 Environmental regulation and productivity
7.1 Empirical strategy
Having found a link between environmental regulation stringency, proxied by PACE, and
innovations, the paper further examines the relations between regulation stringency and
productivity. It is important to note that environmental regulation aﬀects productivity
through a number of channels. On one hand, the firm may need to use additional inputs,
such as labour, materials or capital to comply with environmental requirements (the
direct eﬀect). Consequently, a raise of production costs could result in a negative impact
on productivity in the short run. On the other hand, as was confirmed in the previous
section, environmental regulation would aﬀect the knowledge stock that in turn, could,
show up in productivity (the indirect eﬀect). The latter eﬀect is likely to appear in the
medium-long run.
In view of multiple channels through which environmental regulation aﬀects pro-
ductivity, the link between the former and the latter is traditionally modelled through
a reduced-form equation, where productivity is commonly measured by TFP or, more
rarely, by LP (for example, Gray and Shadbegian, 1993, 2001; Lanoe et al., 2008). In
a reduced-form equation a magnitude of the coeﬃcient associated with environmental
regulation captures the overall eﬀect of environmental regulation that operates through
the diﬀerent channels mentioned above. Particularly, a positive coeﬃcient of environmen-
tal regulation variable would mean that an induced innovation eﬀect, if any, outweighs
additional input costs caused by environmental requirements to such an extent that pro-
ductivity is enhanced, thus supporting the “strong" Porter Hypothesis.
Following the previous literature and assuming a Cobb-Douglas three factor inputs
production function our first reduced-form model relating the level of TFP with environ-
mental regulation and other controls reads as follows: 17
TFPijt =  1lnERijt q +   lnXijt 1 + ↵ij + µt + ✏ijt (5)
17 We also employed Labor Productivity as a productivity indicator. The results using are qualitatively
similar and available from the authors upon request.
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Where TFP is the total-factor productivity, as desribed in Appendix A, in country
i, sector j and time t, respectively. ER denotes the environmental regulation proxied by
PACE. As the productivity impact of environmental regulation is likely to be dynamic, the
next issue to be discussed is the time setting. Given that ER contributes to productivity
growth, the obvious question is, how soon we can expect the environmental regulation
eﬀect. With regards to direct eﬀect of environmental regulation through additional input
costs it is likely to be prompt. What concerns the induced R&D eﬀect, an empirical
literature suggest that R&D brings about productivity growth at a lag of one to three
years (for example, Griﬃth et al., 2004). Moreover, as established in the previous section,
the impact of environmental regulation on R&D is likely to be lagged as well. Thus we
include ER in the reduced-form productivity equation with diﬀerent lags - from one to
four years.
To control for factors that could aﬀect sectoral productivity we include the vector of
covariates X that contains enterprises birth rate (Birth) and death rate (Death), import
penetration (Import), export intensity (Export), and Value Added (VA).
The productivity impact of environmental regulation is conditional on plants survival.
Stringent regulation can results in the closure of some plants. Not accounting for sur-
vivorship the true productivity eﬀect can be understated. To control for the eﬀect of
sector structural change due to enterprises creations, deaths or relocations on produc-
tivity of a sector we incorporate enterprises birth (Birth) rate and deaths rates (Death)
indicators in the equation.
We also include import intensity (Import) as the role of import penetration is stressed
in the cross-country productivity growth literature. The literature suggests a variety of
mechanisms by which trade may aﬀect productivity growth: among them spillovers of
technology from the reverse engineering of imported goods, increased product market
competition, and larger market size (Griﬃth et al., 2004)
We supplement the vector of controls with export intensity (Export) which controls for
a sector‘s participation in foreign trade. As suggested by learning-by-exporting hypoth-
esis, strong competition abroad could encourage productivity improvements (Grossman
and Helpman,1991).
Finally, as larger industries are likely to have greater absolute levels of PACE, we
include Value Added (VA) as a scaling factor.
The variables in X are lagged one year to avoid two-way causation with productivity.
Other than learning-by-exporting eﬀect, the causality can run from productivity to export
through the self-selection eﬀect: higher productivity could cause higher exporting of the
firm. Productivity decrease of the local producers could bring into the country the foreign
producers, thus, increasing import intensity. Moreover, the productivity enhancement
could cause boost of production scale, thus the causality between productivity and VA
could also be bidirectional.
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Next, we move to growth specifications, where productivity growth (rather than levels)
is regressed against its determinants and fixed eﬀects. The model reads as follows:
 TFPijt =  1lnERijt q +   lnXijt 1 + ↵ij + µt + ✏ijt (6)
Where  TFP is “raw" TFP growth indicator as described in Appendix A. 18
In the TFP growth model we supplement the variables in X with measure of TFP
growth at the frontier (TFP growth frontier) and the measure of distance from the techno-
logical frontier (TFP gap) that are found to be an important determinant of productivity
growth (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Griﬃth et al., 2004). The frontier country is
defined as the country with the highest TFP level in sector j and time t. The assump-
tion is that, within each sector and year, the level of eﬃciency, among the other factors,
depends on technological and organisational transfer from the technology-leader coun-
try. This variable aims at capturing the link between TFP growth in the "catching-up"
country with the extent of innovation and knowledge spillovers which are taking place in
the technologically most advanced country. In particular, we assume that TFP growth
in the frontier country leads to faster TFP growth in follower countries by widening the
production possibility set. We also include a technological gap that is defined as a dis-
tance between TFP level of sector j in country i and the frontier country in time t. We
assume that this variable captures the extent to which TFP growth in a specific country
can be explained by the adoption of more eﬃcient existing technologies. The assumption
here is that the larger the technology gap, the higher the potential gains from adopting
more eﬃcient, internationally available, technologies and consequently the faster the rate
of TFP growth.
An important concern in estimating the cross-country sector-level productivity mod-
els is the choice of the fixed eﬀect. Apparently, inclusion of country-sector specific eﬀects
↵ij would be preferred to control for country-sector time-invariant determinants of pro-
ductivity levels and growth rates that are also likely to be correlated with the regressors.
For example, country-sector fixed eﬀects could account for omitted market structure and
other specific country-sector characteristics. On the other hand, using country-sector
specific eﬀects we concentrate on variation of a certain country-sector over time, there-
fore the parameters are identified only through the within dimension of the data. As
one could see from the analysis of variance in Table A.1 of Appendix, TFP indicator (in
levels) has very low within variation (close to zero), therefore will be very imprecisely
estimated from FE regression. Therefore to estimate TFP model in levels we also use
18 To confirm the robustness of our results, we also use the quality-adjusted TFP growth indicator,
which, according to theory, is a better indicator of disembodied technological change than “raw" TFP.
The TFP growth indicator is constructed using the quality-adjusted input indices, as described in (A.3)
of Appendix A. However, the disadvantage of using quality-adjusted TFP growth indicator is that we
loose some observations due to lack of data availability of quality adjusted indices. The results, available
from the authors upon request, are qualitatively similar to the one using the ‘raw" TFP growth indicator.
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an alternative specification that assumes two separate fixed eﬀects, i.e. country eﬀects
↵i and sector eﬀects ↵j. The latter specification mostly relies on the variation across
countries and sectors that could be fruitfully exploited with our TFP data. Moreover,
separate country and sector fixed eﬀects account for a variety of omitted variables in the
productivity equation such as the level of education and skills of labor force, own-sector
regulatory environment etc. To summarise, the specification including country-sector
specific eﬀects ↵ij is desirable on theoretical grounds, since it minimizes the possibility
of unmeasured sector-country characteristics biasing the other coeﬃcients. Therefore, we
use it for estimation of TFP growth model. However, due to low within variation of TFP
level indicator the specification including separate country- and sector-eﬀects seems to
be more appropriate. All the equations include time eﬀects µt that control for common
European-wide aggregate shocks of productivity, and an error term ✏ijt.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that due to productivity data availability we
carry out estimations for eleven European countries (out of seventeen for which PACE
data are available): Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom over the period 1997-2007.
Therefore, the results are not directly comparable with innovation model results that are
estimated for seventeen countries. However, the results available from the author upon
request show that innovation model results are robust to using the country sample of
productivity model.
7.2 Estimation results
As a starting point we verify the impact of generic innovation on TFP levels from the two
diﬀerent specifications described above. As innovation proxies we use the fitted values of
R&D and patent variables predicted from the innovation equation 2.19 The results of the
FE estimation of TFP level model, reported in Columns 1-2 of Table A.2 of Appendix,
demonstrate striking results not favouring the idea that innovation drives the productivity
growth. The coeﬃcients associated with the fitted value of the one-year lagged overall
R&D are insignificant, whereas patent variable is negative and significant.20 Judging
from this model, higher R&D investments over time do not bring any productivity gain
to a certain country-sector, whereas more patent applications decrease its productivity.
Columns 3-4 of Table A.2 present an alternative specification with country- and sector-
fixed eﬀects ↵i and ↵j included separately. Using overall variation of the data (rather
than only within variation) in the latter model we found a positive eﬀect of generic
innovation on productivity, confirming that sectors investing more intensively in R&D
19 Bootsrapped standard errors are applied to properly account for problem of generated regressor.
20 The results are robust to using diﬀerent lags of R&D and patents, using original R&D and patent
values (rather than predicted), as well as R&D and PATENT stock variable (rather than gross R&D and
PATENT).
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Tab. 11: TFP level impact of environmental regulation
FE OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1Y Lagged PACE -0.008 -0.007 - - -0.055** -0.088*** - -
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
2Y Lagged PACE - - -0.006 -0.001 - - -0.050** -0.086***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Lagged Import -0.024 -0.019 -0.022 -0.047 -0.053 0.036 -0.048 0.028
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Lagged Export 0.022 -0.006 0.003 -0.016 0.118 0.148* 0.133 0.158*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
Lagged Death rate - 0.035 - 0.146* - -0.055 - -0.108
(0.04) (0.09) (0.18) (0.22)
Lagged Birth rate - -0.027 - -0.150 - 0.274 - 0.508*
(0.09) (0.11) (0.22) (0.26)
Lagged VA - -0.012 - -0.017 - 0.116*** - 0.000
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.00)
F 6.02*** 5.38*** 6.94*** 6.03*** 19.75*** 21.67*** 21.48*** 21.36***
R-squared 0.18 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.84
Observations 530 476 458 432 530 476 458 432
N.Country-sector 96 95 96 95 96 95 96 95
Note: Country-sector fixed eﬀects in Columns 1-4, separate country- and sector-fixed eﬀects in Columns 5-8.
Set of time dummies included in all models. All the variables are in logs.
Robust standard errors (clustered on the sector-country unit) in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Within R-squared are reported in Columns 1-4.
are more productive than those investing less. The findings of no link between generic
innovation and productivity from the FE model confirms our previous remark about low
within variation of TFP indicator and irrelevance of FE model for verification of the
link between environmental regulation and productivity in the Porter Hypothesis context
using our sample.
Having established relations between generic innovation and TFP level from two dif-
ferent models, we move to a reduced-form model where we regress TFP on one- and
two-years lagged PACE and the set controls. Table 11 reports the results. We use the
model with separate country- and -sector fixed eﬀects as a preferred specification of TFP
level model (Columns 5-8) , but also report the results of the FE model for comparability
(Columns 1-4) . The FE results provide an evidence of negligible eﬀect of environmental
policy on TFP. Diﬀerently from the FE results, the OLS model with separate country-
and -sector fixed eﬀects reveals an adverse eﬀect of environmental policy on TFP in one-
and two-years lagged period. The negative eﬀect is robust to adding and omitting vari-
ous controls (such as Export and Import intensity, Death and Birth rate). Other things
equal, increasing regulation compliance expenditures by 10 percent results in about 0.3-
0.9 percent decrease of TFP. Thus, from the the preferred specification of TFP level
model we conclude that despite of positive eﬀect of generic innovation, stringent reg-
ulation results in a lower productivity. Hence, an induced innovation eﬀect, if any, is
not large enough to overcome additional input costs required for regulation compliance,
consequently, resulting in a productivity drop.
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Tab. 12: TFP growth impact of environmental regulation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1Y Lagged PACE -0.001 0.004 0.004 - - -
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2Y Lagged PACE - - - -0.003 0.002 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
TFP growth at the frontier 0.273*** 0.233** 0.232** 0.169 0.226** 0.226**
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Lagged TFP gap -0.172* -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.038 -0.070** -0.071**
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Lagged Death rate - 0.039 0.039 - 0.086*** 0.087***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Lagged Birth rate - -0.064 -0.064 - -0.055 -0.052
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Lagged Import - -0.021 -0.020 - 0.003 0.006
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Lagged Export - 0.039 0.040 - 0.032 0.035
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Lagged VA - - 0.003 - - 0.008
(0.01) (0.01)
F 3.69*** 3.03*** 2.85*** 3.84*** 7.27*** 6.65***
Within R-squared 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.18 0.18
Observations 542 476 476 470 432 432
N.Country-sector 98 95 95 98 95 95
Note: Country-sector fixed eﬀects and time dummies included in all models. All the variables are in logs.
Robust standard errors (clustered on the sector-country unit) in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Table 12 reports the estimation results of TFP growth model. Regardless of the
controls used, PACE variable always remains insignificant. Moreover, Columns 5-6 of
Table A.2 of Appendix show no link between generic R&D and TFP growth. 21
The coeﬃcients associated with other controls used in the the productivity regres-
sions are in line with the expectations. For instance, participation in international trade
has a positive eﬀect on sectoral TFP level and growth, confirming positive learning-by-
exporting eﬀects. TFP gap term enters TFP growth equation negatively and is significant,
indicating that within each industry the countries that are further behind the frontier ex-
perience higher rates of productivity growth. The TFP growth at the frontier is positive
and significant. This implies that TFP growth in the frontier country leads to faster TFP
growth in follower countries. Finally, the coeﬃcients associated with import penetration
and structural changes are not significant.
7.3 Endogeneity
The potential endogeneity of PACE could be also a concern in the productivity equation.
Firstly, in the FE specification the assumption that omitted common determinants of
cost of regulation (PACE) and productivity at the country-sector level are time-invariant
could be too strong, as these factors are likely to change over time. If this assumption is
relaxed, we can not capture these factors with the country-sector fixed eﬀects ↵ij (and
neither with ↵i and ↵i). Secondly, endogeneity of contemporaneous PACE could arise
21 The results available from the authors upon request show that no impact of generic R&D and PACE
on TFP growth is also robust to relaxing the fixed eﬀects.
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in productivity equation for the likely reverse causality. Firms‘ political pressures to
change regulations are an important potential source of reverse causality. In particular, if
firms respond to negative productivity shocks by “lobbying” for relaxing of environmental
regulations inverse causality would entail positive correlations between productivity and
environmental regulation indicators. Therefore, the impacts of environmental regulations
on productivity could be overestimated. Finally, similar to the innovation equation, pro-
ductivity impact of environmental regulation could be biased due to PACE measurement
error.
To overcome the potential endogeneity issues we adopt an instrumental variable (IV)
approach similar to the one used in innovation equations.We estimate the eﬀect of envi-
ronmental costs on innovation performance using 2SLS and optimal IV-GMM estimators
in the just identifed and the over identified equations, respectively, with country, sector
and time fixed eﬀects (alternatively, we estimates specifications with country-sector and
time fixed eﬀects). Similarly to the innovation equation, the vector of instruments Z in-
cludes an average share of PACE intensity for eight adjacent sectors of the same country
excluding the current sector (PACE/V A j) and its interaction with pre-sample sectoral
energy-intensity (year 1996), EIpresample. The identification assumption is that condi-
tional on import intensity, export intensity, enterprises demographic indicators, fixed
eﬀects and time eﬀects, the instruments are strong predictors of sectoral level PACE
intensity, but are not correlated with unobserved factors impacting productivity.
Table 13 reports the results of the first-stage IV regression. We present the results of
two alternative specification of TFP model in levels - the FE and the OLS -in Columns
1-4 and 5-8, respectively. The results of the TFP growth model are reported in Columns
9-10. The coeﬃcient of PACE/V A j and EIpresample are strongly significant across all
the specifications. The specification tests reported at the bottom of the tables confirm
relevance and validity of the instruments. The Kleibergen-Paap test for weak identifica-
tion F-statistics considerably exceed a widely used rule of thumb equals to 10 (Staiger
and Stock 1997), thus not rejecting the joint significance of excluded restrictions in the
first-stage regression. Moreover, F-statistics are higher than the reported Stock and Yogo
(2005) weak ID test critical value (for 10% relative IV bias toleration) across diﬀerent
specifications (with the exception of Columns 7-8) eliminating the concern that the ex-
cluded instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors (Stock et al.
2002; Stock and Yogo 2005). Another weak-instrument diagnostics that we use is Shea
partial R2 between PACE and the excluded instruments after controlling for the included
instruments in the first-stage regression. Shea partial R2 are relatevely large, thus indi-
cating that the endogenous regressor is not weakly identified.
The validity of the instruments are tested with Hansen J-test. As the reported p-
values of Hansen J-test are greater than 0.05 in all the models, we do not reject the joint
null hypothesis that the instruments are valid, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term, and
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Tab. 13: TFP eﬀect of environmental regulation: First stage results
TFP level TFP growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1Y Lag PACE/V A j 0.683*** 0.580*** - - 0.477*** 0.530*** - - 0.677*** 0.560***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
1Y Lag PACE/V A j*EIpre - -0.508*** - - - 0.150*** - - - -0.564***
(0.19) (0.04) (0.18)
2Y Lag PACE/V A j - - 0.616*** 0.509*** - - 0.400*** 0.456*** - -
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
2 Y Lag PACE/V A j*EIpre - - - -0.501** - - - 0.135*** - -
(0.21) (0.03)
Lagged Import 0.707** 0.793*** 0.867*** 0.868*** -0.430*** -0.380*** -0.403** -0.367** 0.633** 0.697**
(0.28) (0.27) (0.33) (0.31) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.28) (0.28)
Lagged Export -0.904*** -0.852*** -0.406 -0.430 0.034 0.021 0.073 0.059 -0.890*** -0.817***
(0.27) (0.26) (0.36) (0.35) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.27) (0.26)
Lagged Death rate -1.106 -1.075 -1.202*** -1.241*** -0.373 -0.242 -0.812* -0.671 -1.038 -1.000
(0.88) (0.88) (0.28) (0.30) (0.91) (0.90) (0.43) (0.45) (0.89) (0.89)
Lagged Birth rate 1.308 1.293 1.322** 1.244** 1.095 0.969 1.758*** 1.671*** 1.301 1.298
(1.16) (1.16) (0.53) (0.54) (1.14) (1.15) (0.56) (0.57) (1.14) (1.13)
Lagged VA 0.339** 0.447*** 0.397* 0.452** 0.587*** 0.610*** 0.642*** 0.656*** 0.333** 0.456***
(0.13) (0.14) (0.20) (0.18) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.14) (0.15)
F-stat 11.36*** 13.04*** 16.72*** 16.03*** 91.87*** 85.92*** 125.72*** 117.01*** 10.97*** 11.83***
Adj. R-sq 0.40 0.42 0.34 0.35 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.41 0.43
C-test of endog.(P value) 0.201 0.410 0.328 0.749 0.025 0.042 0.017 0.049 0.301 0.156
F instruments 74.02 51.04 53.05 34.21 21.79 19.72 14.48 14.69 73.05 51.31
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical 16.38 19.93 16.38 19.93 16.38 19.93 16.38 19.93 16.38 19.93
( val 10% max IV size)
Partial R-squared 0.28 0.30 0.23 0.25 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.28 0.30
P value Anderson-Rubin F-test 0.04 0.14 0.28 0.32 0.26 0.19 0.13 0.17 0.65 0.75
P value Anderson-Rubin chi-sq test 0.04 0.12 0.27 0.30 0.24 0.16 0.11 0.14 0.64 0.74
P value J-statistic 0.28 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.51
Observations 467 467 413 413 476 476 432 432 467 467
N.Country-sector 86 86 76 76 86 86 76 76 86 86
Note: Coeﬃcient estimates from 2SLS in Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, 9; IV-GMM in Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10. Full set of time dummies included in all models.
Country-sector fixed eﬀects in Columns 1-4 and 9-10. Country- and sector-fixed eﬀects in Columns 5-8. All the variables are in logs.
Robust standard errors (clustered on the sector-country unit) in parentheses.* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Within R2 in Columns 1-4 and 9-10.
Tab. 14: TFP eﬀect of environmental regulation: Second stage results
TFP level TFP growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Instrumented 1Y Lag. PACE -0.020* -0.014* - - 0.037 0.018 - - -0.003 -0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Instrumented 2Y Lag. PACE - - -0.013 -0.005 - - 0.078 0.038 - -
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.04)
TFP growth at the frontier - - - - - - - - 0.241** 0.245***
(0.10) (0.09)
Lagged TFP gap - - - - - - - - -0.084*** -0.085***
(0.03) (0.03)
Lagged Import -0.014 -0.022 -0.041 -0.072 0.085 0.057 0.094 0.059 -0.018 -0.017
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
Lagged Export -0.012 -0.001 -0.020 0.001 0.141 0.111 0.147 0.125 0.036 0.035
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.03) (0.02)
Lagged Death rate 0.027 0.029 0.136* 0.148* -0.036 -0.103 -0.013 -0.087 0.035 0.035
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.24) (0.18) (0.22) (0.21) (0.04) (0.04)
Lagged Birth rate -0.012 -0.023 -0.130 -0.153 0.149 0.197 0.196 0.289 -0.055 -0.054
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.25) (0.21) (0.27) (0.23) (0.05) (0.05)
Lagged VA -0.007 -0.008 -0.012 -0.019 0.039 0.041 0.005 0.025 0.007 0.007
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 467 467 413 413 476 476 432 432 467 467
N.Country-sector 86 86 76 76 86 86 76 76 86 86
Note: See footnotes to Table 13
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conclude that over identifying restriction is valid. The weak-instrument robust Anderson-
Rubin (1949) test statistics does not reject the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients of the
one- and two-years lagged PACE in the structural equation are equal to zero, and, in
addition, that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. Finally, the C-test rejects the
null hypothesis that the the one- and two-years lagged PACE can actually be treated as
exogenous in Columns 5-8 of the productivity model (P value is lower than 0.05). Thus
we conclude that the endogeneity of the lagged PACE is likely to be a concern in the
productivity model.
In fact, the results of the second-stage IV regression, presented in Table 14, do not
confirm the findings of the previous section about a negative link between environmental
regulation and productivity. Accounting for PACE endogeneity in our preferred specifi-
cations of TFP level model, we found that environmental regulation has negligible eﬀect
on productivity regardless of the lag structure used (Columns 5-8). The same results
are confirmed from the TFP growth model estimation (Columns 9-10). 22 Finally, the
results of the FE estimation suggest that ER decreases productivity in the one-year pe-
riod (Columns 1-2). However, we believe that these results should be taken with care,
as it was demonstated before, the FE model does not support as whole the “innovation
channel” of productivity growth.
Taking together the productivity models results, we conclude thus that stringent en-
vironmental regulation does not harm productivity either in one-year or in two-years
period. Rather, the overall productivity eﬀect is neutral. We found some evidence that
not accounting for PACE endogeneity the estimates of productivity eﬀect could be down-
ward biased. On the whole, negligible productivity eﬀect of ER may arise as consequence
of induced innovation eﬀect that helps to neutralise the negative eﬀect of additional com-
pliance costs. Therefore, the results more favour rather than disprove the “strong” Porter
Hypothesis.
7.4 Robustness checks
In this subsection we consider the robustness of our results to several concerns. For
coherence with the TFP level model, we would like to verify sensitivity of the innovation
results to using the model with alternative set of fixed eﬀects. In particular, in Table
16 we present the estimation results of innovation IV model where we relax the fixed
eﬀect ↵ij and assume two separate fixed eﬀects, i.e. country eﬀect ↵i and sector eﬀect
↵j. The results are very much in line with our previous findings on innovation eﬀect
of environmental regulation. In particular, they suggest that increased PACE adversely
aﬀects current R&D and increases patent application in one-year period. However the
22 The results available from the authors upon request show that the PACE beyond the one-year lag
has no eﬀect on TFP growth in the IV regression.
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Tab. 15: R&D and patent eﬀect of environmental regulation: OLS with ↵i and ↵j
R&D PATENT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PACE 0.056 0.031 - - - - - -
(0.07) (0.08)
Lagged PACE - - 0.018 0.005 0.048* 0.003 - -
(0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
2Y Lagged PACE - - - - - - 0.054 -0.033
(0.03) (0.04)
Lagged VA 0.067 0.102 0.107 0.137 0.115** 0.142*** 0.069 0.217***
(0.07) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Lagged GOVR&D -0.338** -0.344** -0.307* -0.369** 0.149 -0.118 0.039 -0.089
(0.14) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.10) (0.07) (0.11) (0.10)
L.ln_RDstock2 0.506*** 0.575*** 0.511*** 0.583*** - - - -
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Lagged INNOstock - - - - 0.666*** 0.658*** 0.743*** 0.672***
(0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.20)
Lagged Export 0.032 0.014 0.073 0.038 0.103 0.152 0.121 0.173
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Lagged Import -0.280* -0.227 -0.233 -0.181 -0.005 -0.036 -0.050 -0.015
(0.16) (0.21) (0.18) (0.20) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12)
Lagged Death rate - 2.660** - 2.353* - 0.533 - 0.474
(1.23) (1.39) (0.53) (0.44)
Lagged Birth rate - -1.611 - -0.083 - 0.233 - 0.695
(1.40) (1.46) (0.29) (0.49)
F 126.39*** 143.17*** 147.88*** 166.51*** 238.48*** 379.47*** 280.68*** 342.81***
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98
Observations 626 498 603 504 802 639 776 587
N.Country-sector
Note: Coeﬃcient estimates from the second-stage FE regression. Country- and sector-fixed eﬀects and set of time dummies
included in all models. All the variables are in logs.
Robust standard errors (clustered on the sector-country unit) in parentheses.* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
positive patent eﬀect vanishes after one year and becomes negative in two-years period.
Another robustness check is related to lags of productivity eﬀect of environmental
regulation. As was mentioned before, innovation could be translated into productivity
improvements with long lags. Moreover, the returns on environmental innovation are
likely to be further lagged, as they regard mostly newly created markets which are small
and fast growing. Short run returns from eco-innovations could be negligible, while
medium-long run returns could be very high. Thus, we test the impact of three and
four years lagged regulation variable in the productivity equation. Estimation results are
reported in Table 17. Similar to the one- and two-years productivity eﬀects, they are
negative and significant (Columns 5 and 7 of Table 17). However, the negative eﬀect of
environmental regulation on TFP is not robust to controlling for PACE endogeneity. The
eﬀect of PACE with longer lags becomes negligible when using IV (Columns 6 and 8 of
Table 17), thus confirming that environmental regulation does not distort productivity
the medium-run.
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Tab. 16: R&D and patent eﬀect of environmental regulation: IV with alternative fixed eﬀects
(↵i and ↵j)
R&D PATENT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Instrumented PACE -0.348 -1.230** - - - - - -
(0.52) (0.51)
Instrumented 1Y Lag. PACE - - -0.189 -0.999 0.137** 0.097* - -
(0.93) (0.68) (0.06) (0.06)
Instrumented 2Y Lag. PACE - - - - - - -0.075* -0.174*
(0.05) (0.09)
Lagged VA 0.129 0.378 -0.004 0.420 0.069 0.078 0.233*** 0.294***
(0.20) (0.27) (0.30) (0.30) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09)
GOVR&D 0.062 -0.083 0.188 -0.486 -0.051 -0.084 -0.114 -0.181*
(0.18) (0.32) (0.54) (0.47) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11)
Lagged R&Dstock 0.610*** 0.743*** 0.512*** 0.683*** - - -
(0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16)
Lagged PATstock - - - - 0.620*** 0.763*** 0.710*** 0.873***
(0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18)
Lagged Export 0.313* 0.500** 0.217 0.511** 0.125 0.044 0.143 0.077
(0.17) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Lagged Import -0.481 -0.834** -0.214 -0.582 -0.003 0.063 -0.036 -0.009
(0.33) (0.41) (0.44) (0.39) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Lagged Death rate 1.049 0.646 2.565** 1.176 0.428 0.079 0.485 0.182
(0.83) (1.11) (1.26) (1.28) (0.51) (0.42) (0.42) (0.41)
Lagged Birth rate -0.044 0.493 -1.304 0.382 0.212 0.214 0.662 0.704
(0.74) (1.00) (1.34) (1.14) (0.34) (0.31) (0.49) (0.51)
Adjusted R-squared 0.94 0.89 0.94 0.90 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Observations 501 481 515 497 612 594 560 535
Note: Coeﬃcient estimates from the second-stage IV regression. Country- and sector-fixed eﬀects and set of time dummies
included in all models. All the variables are in logs.
Robust standard errors (clustered on the sector-country unit) in parentheses.* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Tab. 17: TFP impact of environmental regulation with longer lags (three and four years)
specfications with ↵ij specfications with ↵i and ↵j
(1) (2 IV) (3) (4 IV) (5) (6 IV) (7) (8 IV)
3Y Lagged PACE -0.001 -0.003 - - -0.069** 0.013 - -
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
4Y Lagged PACE - - -0.005 -0.003 - - -0.091*** 0.026
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05)
Lagged Import -0.027 -0.048 -0.117* -0.095* 0.054 0.065 0.036 0.060
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Lagged Export -0.013 -0.015 -0.005 0.017 0.164* 0.130* 0.169** 0.126
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Lagged Death rate 0.131 0.081 0.600*** 0.546*** 1.052** 1.138** 0.686 0.907*
(0.15) (0.13) (0.17) (0.14) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (0.53)
Lagged Birth rate 0.075 0.092 0.134 0.077 -0.270 -0.409 0.895* 0.497
(0.15) (0.13) (0.15) (0.12) (0.42) (0.40) (0.49) (0.52)
Lagged VA -0.018 -0.018 -0.061 -0.080* 0.085* 0.023 0.085 0.005
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Adjusted R-squared 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.17 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.81
Observations 360 360 293 292 360 360 293 293
Note: Set of time dummies included in all models. All the variables are in logs. Within R2 in Columns 1-4
Robust standard errors (clustered on the sector-country unit) in parentheses.* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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8 Conclusive remarks
This paper has provided econometric evidence on the relations between environmental
regulation and competitiveness, as captured by innovation activity and productivity, in a
panel of industrial sectors across seventeen European countries over the period of 1997-
2009. The advantage of our approach mainly concerns providing a combined assessment
of both innovation and productivity impact of environmental regulation that allows to
obtain a complete and robust evidence on the “strong” Porter eﬀect for the sample of
European countries over the last decades. Unlike the few previous studies focusing on
Europe and investigating the eﬀect of environmental regulation on green innovation and
performance (De Vries and Withagen, 2005; Constantini and Crespi, 2008; Johnstone
et al., 2010), we look at overall competitiveness and innovation that are the most rel-
evant indicators for the “strong” PH. This approach allows us to account for potential
opportunity costs of environmental regulation and induced innovations.
Another important distinction of the paper is that it explicitly accounts for poten-
tial edogeneity of PACE in the context of environmental regulation-economic performance
nexus using IV approach. To our knowledge, with the exception of a few papers (De Vries
and Withagen, 2005, Carrion-Flores and Innes, 2010, Kneller and Manderson, 2012) the
existing literature generally does not explicitly account for the endogeneity problem of
PACE variables in the PH context. Our results prove that not controlling for endogeneity
of the PACE variable lead to a biased estimates and in some cases reverse the interpreta-
tion of the environmental regulation eﬀect on economic performance and competitiveness.
Regarding the R&D eﬀect of environmental regulation, we find a positive and sta-
tistically significant eﬀect from the FE estimation. However, the sign of the estimated
innovation eﬀect changes when when properly controlled for PACE endogeneity. Using
IV approach, environmental regulation are proved to lower overall R&D in the one-year
period. Other things equal, raise of environmental expenditure by 10 percent results in
about 3 percent of R&D decrease. Therefore, combined with the evidence of limited
availability of financial resources devoted to R&D activities, we confirm that induced
R&D performed to obtain environmental innovation come at the opportunity cost and
crowd-out general R&D employed in other projects.
Despite the overall R&D decline, we find a positive and statistically significant patent
eﬀect of environmental regulation in the one-year period. Other things equal, an addi-
tional ten percent of regulation compliance expenditure increase number of patent appli-
cations by approximately one percent. This finding is robust for the inclusion of a series of
control variables and controlling for endogeneity of PACE. European firms thus are likely
to increase number of patent applications in respond to strict environmental regulation
with the one-year lag. However, as the whole innovation process from R&D investment
to patent application takes time and induced R&D could be translated into patents with
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more than one year lag, one can argue that R&D related to induced patents took place
before an introduction of stringent environmental regulation. Moreover, judging from
our estimation results, there is no evidence of positive immediate eﬀect of environmental
regulation on R&D. Therefore, we interpret the positive patent eﬀect as an evidence of
more productive R&D in terms of successful innovations or increasing demand for patent
protection, rather than an evidence of increased number of new R&D projects. We believe
that a higher number of patent applications is likely to be associated with expansion of
innovative environmental technologies, that become more beneficial under strict environ-
mental regulation as they help to reduce compliance costs. Moreover, firms could seek to
protect these new environmental technologies with patent to get a first-mover advantage.
Comparing with the earlier sector-level studies, our results on adverse R&D eﬀect of
environmental regulation obtained for the sample of the European countries contrast with
the results of Jaﬀe and Palmer (1997) for the U.S. and Hamamoto (2006) for Japan, where
more PACE are found to bring about significant R&D enhancement eﬀects both in the
short- and the medium-term. We believe that neglecting the issue of PACE endogeneity,
along with the other factors, is the reason for this discrepancy. With regards to the
previous country-level studies on Europe, focusing on specific environmental patents,
rather than overall patent behaviour, they generally conclude that environmental patents
positively responds to environmental policy (Vries and Withagen, 2005; Popp, 2006;
Johnstone, Hasic and Popp, 2008). However, they do not consider the opportunity costs
of environmental innovation. Therefore, our results are not directly comparable with
these studies.
Having found a link between environmental stringency and overall innovation, the
paper further examines the relations between environmental regulation and productivity.
Overall, our analysis confirms a positive contribution of generic R&D to productivity.
Assuming that positive induced innovations eﬀect on productivity, if any, will show up
in the medium-long run due to the fact that the impact of environmental regulation
on R&D is likely to be lagged and that R&D, in turn, could bring about productivity
growth at a lag of several years. Thus, we consider the policy variable with diﬀerent lags
- from one- to four-years period. Not accounting for PACE endogeneity we found that
environmental regulation adversely aﬀects productivity. Other things equal, spending
one additional percent of total costs on regulation compliance results in about two-three
percent decrease of measured TFP from one- to four-years lagged period. However, the
negative eﬀect on TFP does not show up when we apply IV approach, highlighting that
the estimates of productivity eﬀect are likely to be downward biased in the OLS model.
The overall productivity eﬀect of regulation becomes neutral more favouring rather than
disproving the “strong” Porter Hypothesis. In fact, the result of a negligible impact on
productivity is compatible with the presence of positive induced R&D eﬀect that helps
to mitigate additional input cost spent on regulation compliance. Despite of the fact that
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firms invest less in R&D, as proved in our estimation, we could assume that they invest
“smarter” and thus become more eﬃcient. On the other hand, high direct costs imposed
on regulated firms are likely to be the reason of no productivity gain and negligible impact
of environmental regulation on productivity that we observe on the sample of European
countries.
The evidence that more stringent environmental regulation does not aﬀect productiv-
ity don’t support the conclusions of the early U.S. studies (Gray and Shadbegian (1993,
2001)) about depressing eﬀect of environmental regulation on industrial productivity.
Our results also do not concur with the results of the sector-level productivity investiga-
tions of Hamamoto, 2006 for Japan, Lanoie, Patry and Lajeunesse, 2008 for Canada and
Yang, Tseng, Chen, 2012 for Taiwan that conclude that stringent environmental policy
spur productivity growth. Again, we believe that one of the reason for this disagreement
is the treatment of PACE endogeneity.
Apparently, the limitation of our analysis is that due to limited PACE availability
we could not consider a number of large economies of the EU that widely apply various
regulatory instruments for pollution control and natural resource management, such as
Germany, France and Italy. Moreover, due to productivity measures availability our
productivity analysis is based on the investigation of the few countries of interest (Czech
Republic, Finland, Hungary, Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom,
Lithuania, Poland, Portugal) and relatively short time period, that does not allow to
consider increasing number of recent environmental policies, that entered into force after
2006 as consequence of EU-wide environmental strategy. Therefore, as soon as new PACE
and productivity data become available, it can be very interesting to estimate innovation
and productivity impacts of environmental regulation on a large sample of countries and
over a longer period. This could be a topic for further research.
Furthermore, given some inconsistency in our findings for innovation and productivity
response, further research is needed before these results can be considered complete and
conclusive. In order to understand better the implications of the stringent environment
policy on industrial competitiveness of the EU countries, it would be interesting to dis-
entangle the contribution of environmental regulation to growth of green innovations and
other innovations, and to study, subsequently, how diﬀerent type of innovations contribute
to productivity growth across the European countries. Unfortunately, the sector-level en-
vironmental innovation data is missing for the European countries and thus do not allow
to carry our the structural analysis of pollution control and abatement eﬀorts on economic
performance of the European manufacturing industries.
9 References 37
9 References
1. Baumol W. (2002),The Free-Market Innovation Machine: Analyzing the Growth
Miracle of Capitalism. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
2. Botta, E. and T. Kozluk (2014), Measuring Environmental Policy Stringency in
OECD Countries, OECD, February, preliminary draft.
3. Brunel, C. and A. Levinson (2013), Measuring Environmental Regulatory Strin-
gency, OECD Trade and Environment Working Papers N. 2013/05.
4. Brunnermeier. S. and Cohen M. (2003), Determinants of environmental innova-
tion in US manufacturing industries. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Managetnent 45: 278 -293.
5. Caballero R. and Jaﬀe A.(1993), How High Are The Giants’ Shoulders? In O.
Blanchard and S. Fischer (Eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Volume 8, pp.
15-74. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
6. Cameron A. C. and Trivedi P. K. (2010) Microeconometrics Using Stata, Revised
Edition, Stata Press.
7. Carrin-Flores C.E. and Innes R., (2010), Environmental innovation and environ-
mental performance, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Else-
vier, vol. 59(1), pages 27-42.
8. Clark K. and Griliches Z. (1984), Productivity Growth and RD at the Business
Level: Results from the PIMS Data Base, NBER Chapters, in: R&D, Patents, and
Productivity, pages 393-416 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
9. Costantini V. and Mazzanti M. (2011), On the green and innovative side of trade
competitiveness? The impact of environmental policies and innovation on EU ex-
ports, Journal of Research Policy-2619.
10. Costantini V. and Crespi F. (2008), Environmental regulation and the export dy-
namics of energy technologies. Ecological Economics, 66, 447-460.
11. De Vries and Withagen (2005), Innovation and Environmental Stringency: The
Case of Sulfur Dioxide Abatement, CentER Discussion Paper 2005-18, Tilburg Uni-
versity, The Netherlands.
12. Edenhofer O. and Stern N. (2009), Towards a global green recovery. Recommenda-
tions for immediate G20 action. Report submitted to the G20 London summit.
13. EU KLEMS (2009). Growth and Productivity Accounts database. November 2009
release.
14. EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2010), Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustain-
able and inclusive growth.
15. EUROSTAT (2012a). Detailed enterprise statistics on manufacturing subsections.
9 References 38
16. EUROSTAT (2012b). Patent statistics database.
17. EUROSTAT (2012c). Environmental protection expenditure in Europe database.
18. EUROSTAT (2012d). Renewable energy statistics. Statistics Explained.
19. EUROSTAT (2012e). Environmental taxes by economic activity database.
20. EUROSTAT (2012f). National account statistics database.
21. EUROSTAT (2012d). Business demography statistics database.
22. Gray W. and Shadbegian R. (1993), Pollution Abatement Costs, Regulation, and
Plant-Level Productivity, NBER Working Paper 4994, January 1995.
23. Gray W. and Shadbegian R. (2001), Plant vintage, technology and environmental
regulation, NBER Working Paper 8480, September 2001.
24. Griﬃth R., Redding S. and Van Reenen J. (2004), Mapping the Two Faces of R&D:
Productivity Growth in a Panel of OECD Industries, The Review of Economics and
Statistics, 86(4): 88395.
25. Griliches Z. (1980), Returns to R&D expenditures in the private sector, in (eds)
Kendrick, K and Vaccara, B, New Developments in Productivity Measurement,
Chicago University Press.
26. Griliches Z. (1990), Patent statistics as economic indicators: A survey, Journal of
Economic Literature 28(4): 1661-1707.
27. Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. (1991). Innovation and growth in the global econ-
omy. Cambridge, Massachussets. The MIT Press.
28. Inklaar R. and Timmer M. (2008), GGDC Productivity Level Database: interna-
tional comparisons of output, inputs and productivity at the industry level. Re-
search Memorandum GD-104.
29. Hamamoto M. (2006), Environmental regulation and the productivity of Japanese
manufacturing industries. Resource and Energy Economics 28, 299-312.
30. Hey C. (2006), EU environmental policies: a short history of the policy strategies.
In: Scheuer, S. (Ed.), EU Environmental Policy Handbook: A Critical Analysis
of EU Environmental Legislation. European Environmental Bureau, Brussels, pp.
17-30.
31. Horbach J., Rammer C. and Rennings K. (2012), Determinants of Eco-innovations
by Type of Environmental Impact. The Role of Regulatory Push/Pull, Technology
Push and Market Pull, Ecological Economics 78, 112 -122.
32. Jaﬀe A., Peterson S., Portney P. and Stavins R. (1995), Environmental Regulation
and the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?,
Journal of Economic Literature XXXIII, 132-163.
33. Jaﬀe A. and Palmer K. (1997), Environmental Regulation and Innovation: A Panel
Data Study, The Review of Economics and Statistics 79(4): 610-619.
9 References 39
34. Jaﬀe A., Newell R., Stavins R. (2005), A tale of two market failures: Technology
and environmental policy, Ecological Economics 54, 164-174.
35. Joutz F. and Gardner T. (1996), Economic Growth, Energy Prices and Technolog-
ical Innovation, Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 62, No. 3, pp. 653-66.
36. Johnstone N., Hascic I. and Popp D. (2010), Renewable Energy Policies and Tech-
nological Innovation: Evidence based on Patent Counts, Environmental Resource
Economics 45, 133-155.
37. Keller W. (2002), Geographic Localization of International Technology Diﬀusion.
American Economic Review 92(1), 120-142.
38. Kneller R., Manderson E. (2012), Environmental regulations and innovation activity
in UK manufacturing industries. Resource and Energy Economics 34 (2012) 211-
235.
39. Lanjouw J., and Mody A. (1995), Innovation and the International Diﬀusion of
Environmentally Responsive Technology. World Bank Working Paper. Washington
DC.
40. Lanoie P., Patry M. and Lajeunesse R. (2008), Environmental Regulation and Pro-
ductivity: New Findings on the PH, Journal of Productivity Analysis 30, 121-128.
41. Levin R., Cohen W., Mowery D. (1985), R&D Appropriability, Opportunity, and
Market Structure: New Evidence on Some Schumpeterian Hypotheses, American
Economic Review, Vol. 75, pp.20-24
42. Nicoletti G. and Scarpetta S. (2003), Regulation, productivity and growth: OECD
evidence, Economic Policy, CEPR CES MSH, vol. 18(36), pages 9-72, 04.
43. OECD (1996). Pollution Control and Abatement Expenditure in OECD Countries,
Environment Monograph OECD/GD(96)50, Paris : OECD.
44. OECD (2001). OECD Measuring Productivity Manual. Paris: OECD.
45. OECD (2009). OECD Patent Statistics Manual. Paris: OECD.
46. OECD (2012a). Analytical Business Enterprise Research and Development database.
47. OECD (2012b). Database for Structural Analysis.
48. OMahony M. and Timmer M. (2009), Output, input and productivity measures at
the industry level: the EU KLEMS database. The Economic Journal, 119 (June).
49. Park W. G. (1995), International RD Spillovers and OECD Economic Growth,
Economic Inquiry, 33, 571-591.
50. Palmer K., Oates W. and Portney P. (1995), Tightening Environmental Standards:
The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost Paradigm?, Journal of Economic Perspectives
9(4), 119-132.
51. Porter M. (1991), American’s Green Strategy, Scientific American, 264, 168.
9 References 40
52. Porter M. E. and Van der Linde C. (1995), Towards a New Conception of the
Environmental-Competitiveness Relationship, Journal of Economic Perspectives 9,
97-118.
53. Ravenscraft D. J., and Scherer F. M.(1982), The Lag Structure of Returns to Re-
search and Development, Applied Economics 14, 603-620.
54. Rubashkina Y. (2013), Environmental regulation and competitiveness. Evidence
from the literature on the Porter Hypothesis, mimeo.
55. Schumpeter J. (1943), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London: Allen and
Unwin (originally published in the USA in 1942; reprinted by Routledge, London
in 1994).
56. Schmookler J. (1966), Invention and Economic Growth. Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard University Press.
57. Verdolini E. and Galeotti M. (2011), At home and abroad: An empirical analy-
sis of innovation and diﬀusion in energy technologies, Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 119-134, March.
58. WIOD (2012). World Input-Output Database database. February 2012 release.
59. Yang C., Tseng Y. and Chen C. (2012), Environmental regulations, induced R&D,
and productivity: Evidence from Taiwan-s manufacturing industries. Resource and
Energy Economics 34 (2012) 514-532.
A Construction of productivity indicators 41
A Construction of productivity indicators
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas three factor inputs production function, the level of TFP is
defined as the portion of output not explained by the amount of factor inputs used in
production :
TFPijt = lnGOijt   ↵ijt lnLijt    ijt ln Iijt   (1  (↵ijt +  ijt)) lnKijt (A.1)
Where TFP denotes the level of TFP, GO is gross output, K is net capital stock, L is
labor hours (of total engaged) and I is intermediate inputs (including energy, service and
material inputs). All the monetary variables are expressed in constant prices and PPPs.
Concerning the inputs weights, there are two widely used approaches to estimate ↵ and
 . On the one hand, we can assume that input markets are competitive and that there
are no sources of rents to the firm (e.g., assume constant returns to scale and perfect
competition). This implies that the coeﬃcients ↵ and   are the shares of revenue re-
ceived by each of the factors. On the other hand, one can assume that the coeﬃcients
are (roughly) constant across entities and estimate them via a regression. We follow the
first approaches and compute ↵ and   as the labour input and intermediate input shares
in total costs, respectively. The assumption of constant return to scale implies that sum
of input shares is equal to 1. To compute the labour input share we adjust the labour
compensation by the ratio of total employment to total employees to account for the
compensation of self-employed. They are not registered in the National Accounts and,
therefore, not included in the labor compensation indicator. To obtain the capital input
share, we calculate the nominal capital value as the residual of gross output minus labour
compensation in nominal values. If the residual and therefore the share in total output
are negative, we use a simple heuristic rule suggested in O‘Mahony and Timmer (2009)
and constrain capital compensation to be non-negative, setting it to zero.
To calculate quantities of input and output, nominal values are deflated by industry-
specific relative prices (PPPs). PPPs are output- and various types of inputs-specific and
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are available for all the EU countries at a detailed EU KLEMS industry level from the
GGDC Productivity Level database (Inklaar and Timmer (2008)).The limitation of these
price indices is that they are available only for the year 1997. Therefore, to extrapolate
PPPs for the period 1995-2007 we back and update PPPs of 1997 using price deflators
for each country relative to the US, which is a benchmark country, at a detailed industry
level. For example, PPPs for VA is extrapolated as follows:
PPPijt =
V A_Pijt/V A_Pij1997
V A_Pusjt/V A_Pusj1997
⇤ PPPij1997 (A.2)
Where V A_P is VA deflator. Similar methodology is used for extrapolation of output
and intermediate inputs PPPs. However, we follow a diﬀerent procedure to obtain capital
inputs due to the lack of the capital input deflators. We adjust the capital stock (in
constant 1997 prices) obtained from the EU KLEMS with the PPPs for capital service.
The capital PPPs is not available for Greece, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, therefore, for
these countries we apply PPPs for GO. 23
As argued in the literature, a major issue in the construction of TFP measures is
the need to control for the quality of inputs. TFP estimates constructed from the mea-
sures of labor and capital inputs that are not adjusted for the skill composition of the
workforce, on one hand, and for the composition of the capital stock inputs, on the other
hand, capture both disembodied and embodied components of technological progress (see
Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; O‘Mahony and Timmer, 2009). The disembodied compo-
nent captures technological and organisational improvements that increase output for a
given amount of quality and compositionally adjusted-inputs. The second component
of technological progress is termed embodied and proxies for the improvements in the
productive capacity due to shifts to higher quality factor inputs (Nicoletti and Scarpetta
2003). Therefore, any “raw” TFP indicator captures both embodied and disembodied
aspects of technical change, whereas a quality-adjusted TFP indicator measures produc-
tivity obtained through technological and eﬃciency improvements.
23 The drawback is that we don’t adjust the capital stock for possible price changes in the benchmark
country.
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We calculate the quality-adjusted TFP growth as the real growth of output minus a
weighted growth of inputs services:
 eTFPijt =   ln G˜Oijt   ↵¯ij  ln L˜ijt    ¯ij  ln I˜ijt
 (1  (↵¯ij +  ¯ij))  ln K˜ijt (A.3)
Where G˜Oijt denote gross output index, L˜ijt, I˜ijt and K˜ijt are labor services, inter-
mediate input and capital services indices, respectively, and ↵¯ij and  ¯ij are the average
inputs shares over two periods computed as following:
↵¯ij = 0.5(↵ijt + ↵ijt 1) (A.4)
 ¯ij = 0.5( ijt +  ijt 1) (A.5)
Similarly, we define the "raw" TFP growth indicator, using the output and inputs vari-
ables as defined in (2).
We also need to address an issue of sectoral aggregation in our data. The EU KLEMS
dataset breakdown diﬀers from the nine-sectors PACE classification that we use 24. We
therefore need to merge some of the sub-sectors to conform with the required classi-
fication. We collapse “Chemicals and chemical” and “Rubber and plastic products” in
the sector 6. As well, we collapse “Machinery and equipment”, “Electrical and optical
equipment”, “Transport equipment” and “Manufacturing ned; recycling” to obtain sector
9. Still, some inconsistency remains between productivity and PACE measures sectoral
breakdown. Firstly, in PACE sectoral breakdown “Fabricated metal” is included in sec-
tor 9, while in the EU KLEMS it is reported together with “Basic metal” and could
not be isolated and attributed to sector 9. We correct the nominal input and output
values associated with sectors 8 and 9 by computing “Fabricated metal” value share in
24 The EU KLEMS provides 28 manufacturing sub-sectors break-down
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aggregated metal sector from the EU KLEMS (March 2008 Release, which reports these
two sub-sectors separately). The only (minor) problem that remains and, unfortunately,
could not be solved is that while “Recycling” is excluded from sector 9 for PACE, it is
included and could not be isolated from sector 9 in the EU KLEMS. But we believe that
as the sector 9 is composed of several sub-sectors, the contribution of “Recycling” to its
productivity is smoothed.
For aggregation of the inputs and output indices across sub-sectors we use Tornqvist
quantity index (as suggested by O‘Mahony and Timmer 2009).Unfortunately, we can’t
adjust the indices for the inconsistently between quality-adjusted TFP and PACE mea-
sures in sectors 8 and 9 classification, so we should keep it in mind the minor diﬀerence
in sectoral breakdown when using quality-adjusted TFP growth measure in our analysis.
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Tab. A.1: Variance analysis of the main variables
Variable Mean St.deviation
ln_PACE overall 3.308 1.660
between 1.541
within 0.472
ln_R&D overall 2.835 2.158
between 2.134
within 0.421
ln_PAT overall 1.854 1.916
between 1.888
within 0.324
TFP overall 1.156 0.437
between 0.434
within 0.068
TFP growth overall 0.013 0.042
between 0.011
within 0.040
Tab. A.2: Impact of generic innovation on TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged R&DPRED -0.068 - 0.100*** - -0.001 -
(0.06) (0.02) (0.00)
Lagged PATPRED - -0.078* - 0.070** - 0.000
(0.04) (0.03) (0.00)
TFP growth at the frontier - - - - 0.179 0.210**
(0.11) (0.10)
Lagged TFP gap - - - - 0.020*** 0.007
(0.01) (0.01)
Lagged VA -0.055 -0.018 -0.076 -0.001 - -
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Lagged Death rate 0.328 0.167 0.613 0.100 -0.023 0.058
(0.25) (0.24) (0.89) (0.78) (0.08) (0.06)
Lagged Birth rate -0.378* 0.115 0.374 0.603 -0.003 -0.042
(0.21) (0.22) (0.83) (0.60) (0.09) (0.07)
Lagged Import -0.032 -0.087 0.084 0.020 -0.008*** -0.005
(0.12) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
Lagged Export -0.030 -0.043 0.046 0.150*** 0.006** 0.003
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)
R-squared 0.23 0.20 0.84 0.84 0.16 0.18
Observations 296 354 296 354 296 354
N.Country-sector 84 86 84 86 84 86
Note: Country-sector fixed eﬀects in Columns 1-2, 5-6, separate country and sector fixed eﬀects
in Columns 3-4. Set of time dummies included in all models. All the variables are in logs.
Bootsrapped standard errors in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Within R2 in Columns 1-2, 5-6.
Environmental Policy Indicator: Application of
a three-level random intercept model
Abstract
This paper presents a novel approach, inspired by the literature on
multilevel latent models and Item Response Theory (IRT), to assessing
and comparing countries’ environmental and energy policy portfolios
and performance. We use data on energy eﬃciency policy targeting
industrial sectors in 27 EU countries between 2004 and 2009 and rank
countries with respect to their ability to implement policy over time.
Unlike previous contributions in this respect, our model accounts for
the inherent diﬃculty of a given policy instrument mix. Moreover, the
model is extended to deal with the longitudinal nature of our data and
to adjust the country ranking as a result of economic and institutional
observables which are likely to aﬀect policy design and implementation.
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2
1 Introduction
Addressing pressing climate concerns by limiting bluehouse gas emission, sup-
porting renewable energy production and increasing energy eﬃciency is one
of the five objective of Europe 2020, the sustainable growth stategy that EU
member states launched in 2010 as a response to the recent global economic
crisis.1 To support these goals, which have been declined in national targets
for each member state, a number of environmental and energy policies have
been put in place so far and will be implemented in the years to come. A major
challenge researchers and policy makers alike have been struggling with is the
assessment of such policies and how countries are performing in this respect.
Appropriately describing and understanding the past performance of coun-
tries with respect to energy and environmental policies, and their ability to
implement a more or less complex portofolio of policy instruments, is a cru-
cial step in ensuring that future interventions are drafted in a sound and
cost-eﬀective way. An in-depth analysis in this respect is however currently
missing, partly due to lack of appropriate data, but also to more complex
conceptual problems, as pointed out in Brunel & Levinson (2013).
Specifically, quantitative assessments of environmental and energy policy
implementation are often charachterized by a series of important shortcomings.
First, to address climate and energy concerns countries can choose from a
wide array of policy instruments, each of which is charachterized by a diﬀerent
level of eﬀectiveness, dynamic eﬃciency and political acceptability (Fisher &
Newell, 2008). Second, the ability of countries to implement certain low cost
options might depend crucially on some “initial condition” or on some time
varying charachteristics, such as the level of energy eﬃciency of the economy,
the age of capital, the industrial composition or the political framework. For
example, more polluting countries can possibly reap the lower hanging fruits,
while countries which are already on the path of supporting eﬃciency and blue
energy might need to resort to more costly options.
This paper contributes to the literature by providing a novel approach to
assessing and comparing countries’ environmental policy portfolios and per-
1The Europe 2020 strategy includes five main objectives: ensuring 75 % employment
of 20/64-year-olds; Getting 3 % of the EU’s GDP invested into research and development;
limiting bluehouse gas emissions by 20 % or even 30 % compared to 1990 levels, creating 20
% of EU energy needs from renewables and increasing energy eﬃciency by 20 %; reducing
school dropout rates to below 10 %, with at least 40 % of 30/34-year-olds completing tertiary
education; ensuring 20 million fewer people are at risk of poverty or social exclusion.
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formance. This method, inspired by the literature on multilevel latent models
and Item Response Theory (IRT), results in a ranking of European countries
with respect to their ability to implement energy and environmental policy
which accounts for the inherent diﬃculty of a given policy instrument mix.
Moreover, the model is extended to deal with the longitudinal nature of our
data and to adjust the country ranking as a result of country-specific observ-
ables which are likely to aﬀect policy implementation, such as the level of
energy eﬃciency or other institutional characteristics.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review
of the available literature and summarizes the contributions of this paper.
Section 3 presents our data and empirical model. Section 4 summarizes the
empirical results and presents the ranking of countries in each particular year
over the period 2004-2009 in terms of their ability to implement environmental
policies which accounts for the complexity of the policy mix put into place and
the eﬀect of economic and institutional observables. Section 5 concludes with
a summary of main results, policy implications and a list of future research
needs.
2 Literature Review
A number of previous contributions set forth to building environmental and
energy policy indicators to help reseachers and policy makers alike address
important questions such as the impact of policy on innovation, on energy
eﬃciency, on growth and on overall economic performance. Brunel & Levinson
(2013) provide a comprehensive review of the litearature in this respect. In
doing so, they identify the main conceptual issues that plague previous eﬀorts
to create an index of energy and environmental policy stringency.
First, creating a reliable indicator is challenging due to the issue of multidi-
mensionality. Governments regulate various aspects of energy production and
environmental protection, namely air, water, toxic chemicals, but also energy
eﬃciency and renewable energy production. Moreover, policy instruments can
be aimed at regulating pollution directly, thorough either a command-and-
control or a market-based approaches. In addition, environmental and energy
policies per se can be combined with policies aimed at addressing the knowl-
edge market failure externality, and stimulate the creation and diﬀusion of
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less polluting technologies.2 Such heterogeneity in policy responses and in the
sectors targeted makes it hard to build an indicator that is at the same time
comprehensive and detailed enough to capture changes in all diﬀerent aspects
of a country’s policy portfolio.
Second, while policy makers and resarchers ideally would want to measure
the eﬀect of policy on other important outcome variables such as industry
location, trade patters, economic growth or knowledge transfer, the variables
measuring the stringency of environmental regulation are plagued by simul-
taneity and endogeneity. One must therefore bear in mind that policies are
often jointly determined with other outcome variables and that they themself
are not exogenous, but are the result of forces within the economic system.
Finally, some countries/sectors might have a “comparative” advantage with
respect to other in implementing strict environmental policy. This might be
due to their industrial composition, but also to the vintage of capital or to the
fact that they are more polluting to begin with. This gives them the option to
implement low-cost high-reduction (or high-eﬃciency improvement) policies.
Given the diversity of policies portfolios implemented and the heterogeneity
across sectors, many have resorted to ad hoc datasets which are tailored to
answering a specific research question (Jeppsen & Folmer, 2001). However, as
pointed out in Carraro et al. (2010) greater accuracy comes at the cost of
limited comparability and results across studies focusing on diﬀerent sectors
are often not comparable.
Popular proxies for regulatory stringency are data on private sector abate-
ment expenditures. Such data inform on the level of financial eﬀort a given
firm/sector has to face to comply with given standards (Berman & Bui, 2001;
Hamamoto, 2006; Jaﬀe & Palmer, 1997; Lanjouw & Mody, 1996). The jus-
tification of this indicator is based on the assumption that profit maximising
firms typically face marginal abatement costs that are increasing in pollution
abatement. However, pollution abatement costs (PACs) are plagued with re-
verse causality issues. Moreover, if the data is used at the aggregated level,
2Environmental (and energy) policy directly targets the environmental externality by
regulating pollutants or emissions. On the one hand, command-and-control policy instru-
ments include mandates and standard, and are charactherized by the fact that they set
a minimum requirement for firms to comply with. On the other hand, market-based ap-
proaches such as taxes and permits allow firms to respond more flexibly to comply with the
regulation. Conversely, technology policy targets the knowledge market failure and supports
R&D in blueer and more eﬃcient technologies with, among other options, research subsidies
and investments.
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such as sectors or countries, changes in PACs might result from changes due to
unobserved heterogeneity rather than from changes in regulatory stringency.
Finally, in the presence of market of behavioral failues abatement expenditures
no longer successfully measure the level of regulatory pressure (Berman & Bui,
2001).
Other popolar indicators of choice include reductions in emissions or pollu-
tants or indicators based on energy use (Cole & Elliot, 2003; Gollop & Roberts,
1983). Aggregated over firms or sectors, these variables are also likely to mir-
ror changes such as factor prices rather than regulatory stringency. When they
are used at the disaggregated level, it is often hard to build indicators that can
be used in cross sectoral or cross country analysis due to the heterogeneity of
the regulated pollutants.
Changes in regulation-based measures have also been used to judge the level
of policy stringency (Popp, 2003, 2010). However, proxies based on normative
prescriptions do not account for the level of actual enforcement of a given
policy and might also be subjects to issues of reverse causality (Brunnermeier
& Cohen, 2003; Shimshack & Ward, 2005).
To compare diﬀerent sectors and countries, an extensive literature resorts
to building general composite indexes through the use of aggregation tech-
niques. The data used to this end include information on the presence or
absence of a given policy (0-1 indicators) or scores from surveys of government
oﬃcials or business leaders (Kellenberg, 2009; Tobey, 1990). When using data
from surveys, these indexes tend to capture only perceived, and not actual,
regulatory stringency (Johnstone et al. , 2010).
(Johnstone et al. , 2010) and Vona & Nicolli (2012) propose two diﬀerent
aggregate indicators to measure the level of renewable environmental policies
in European countries. First, an average-based indicator which uses infor-
mation on the timing of adoption of a given policy instrument (eﬀectively, an
average - TO DELETE THISWORD dummy variables indicators equal to zero
before the instrument is put into place and equal to one afterwards). Second,
a more complex indicator is built using principal component analysis rely-
ing both on dummy variables and on intensity of specific policy instruments
such as Renewable Energy Certificates of Feed-in Tariﬀs. This approach is
more sophisticated than previous eﬀorts in this sense, since the factor loadings
resulting from the PCA in Vona & Nicolli (2012) can be interpreted as impor-
tance weights which vary by item/policy. However, in this approach countries
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are all considered equal, namely they have the same propensity to implement
any of the policy instruments. Focus only on renewable energy policy. 3
In this paper, we apply an approach inspired by Item Response Theory to
study and describe the level of environmental policy within a set of countries.
Our contribution is novel in several respects. First, while the basic approach we
propose has been applied in the statistical literature of scoring, its application
to the context of environmental policy is new. Second, we extend the basic
IRT model to a multilevel framework which is consistent with the nature of the
policy data available. Third, our approach allows to attribute diﬀerent weights
or diﬃculty levels to the diﬀerent policy instrumentes included in the policy
portfolio. Thus, our assessment is conditional on the specific complexity of
each country’s policy portfolio. Fourth, we combine the multilevel IRT model
with a latent regression, thereby allowing each country scores to be conditioned
on observed country’s characteristics.
In the next Section, we briefly summarize the data used in this paper and
present our extended multi-level model.
3 Empirical Strategy
The data we use in this application is the one developed within Rubaskina et al.
(2013), namely a set of policy indicators for a sample of 27 countries within
the years 2004-2009. The data is extracted from the Mesures d’Utilisation
Rationnelle de l’Energie (MURE) database, which collects information on the
adoption time of selected energy eﬃciency policy measures for the rational
use of energy and for the promotion of end-use renewables in the manufac-
turing sector of EU Member States. The information is provided by national
energy agencies or institutes according to harmonised guidelines (Schlomann
and Eichhammer 2011). The MURE includes the national policies that have
macro-economic impact, imposing a quality threshold which eliminates low-
impact policies. Distinguished feature of MURE is “semi-quantitative” impact
evaluation of each policy, that is reported at three levels - igh ediumr ow The
category is based on the percentage of overall final energy or electricity sav-
ings and carbon dioxide emissions reductions achieved over a given time-frame
3Moreover, as demonstrated in Ferrari & Salini (2011) the presence of dummy variables
should require Categorical Principal Components Analysis (CATPCA) which is not based
on the assumption of linear correlation.
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by a sector or, in case of fuel substitution and CHP, on the percentage of pri-
mary energy consumption reduction. Table shows the energy and CO2 savings
thresholds defined for each level of “semi-quantitative” impact. 4
Policy Impact in term
of Energy and CO2
savings of the sector
Energy and CO2
savings of the
sector
Weight
Low < 0.1% 1
Medium 0.1- 0.5% 2
High   0.5% 3
We use information on five diﬀerent environmental policy instruments de-
rived from the MURE: Regulatory Policies, Voluntary Measures, Financial
Instruments, Fiscal/tax reductions and Information/Education, Regulatory
policies include norms and standards, such as energy eﬃciency levels for var-
ious kinds of equipments and production processes or products, which often
are based on the phase out of old technologies. Voluntary agreements include
the creation of industry/government cooperation, as well as various indus-
try initiative aimed at promoting higher levels of energy eﬃciency. Financial
instruments include investment subsidies and low interest loans, as well as in-
centives and subsidies for energy audits. Fiscal measure include tax credit and
exemptions which are put in place to target higher levels of eﬃciency within
industrial sectors. Information and education policies and measure are aimed
at increasing the awareness of technology users and their knowledge about
opportunities for eﬃciency improvements.
We construct an ordered categorical variable for each policy instrument by
weighting each policy according to the "semi-quantitative impact" evaluation
and counting the weighted policies of a particular type which are active in
any given year. To weight the policies by impact evaluation we recoded im-
pact evaluation into the numerical weights of 1, 2, or 3, with each correspond
to high, medium and low impact, respectively. The advantage of using the
weighted count as the policy proxy is that it captures stringency and level of
implementation of each policy under consideration. Thus, our policy proxies
account for number of diﬀerent policies in place, as well as their stringency,
4The estimated energy savings (fuels and electricity) and carbon dioxide emissions reduc-
tions achieved over a given time-frame is reported when a quantitative evaluation is available
for a measure. If no quantitative evaluation is available, or in addition to the quantitative
evaluation, a qualitative expert judgement of measure impact in terms of energy and CO2
savings is reported (high/medium/low)
8
Table 1: Summary statistics of the policy variables: initial vs final categorisation
Variable Unit Original scale New scale
Min. Max Min. Max
1 Regulatory Policies Weight. count 0 12 0 3
2 Financial Instruments of policy programs 0 17 0 5
3 Voluntary Measures 0 13 0 4
4 Fiscal/tax reductions 0 16 0 2
5 Information/Education 0 13 0 4
6 Energy taxation Eﬀective tax rate, 52,6 259,2 0 4
TOE/EURO
that we believe is an improvement upon the earlier environmental policy indi-
cators (e.g. Vona & Nicolli (2012)).
We complimented the policy variables constructed from MURE with a
variable of energy tax policy, increasingly favoured in European countries. 5
Energy tax is a tax on energy products used for both transport and stationary
purposes and CO2 emission. As a proxy of energy tax we use eﬀective en-
ergy tax rate, defined as energy tax revenues over final energy consumption in
EURO/TOE, obtained from the EUROSTAT (EUROSTAT, 2013). For con-
sistency with the other ordinal policy variables, we turn our tax variable into
categories from 0 to 4. The higher is the value of a numerical measure, the
higher category is assigned.
5We don’t use the energy tax policy information in MURE as it is very incomplete,
records for many countries that use energy tax as a policy instrument are missing. Hence
we use the data from the EUROSTAT
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Given the nature of our data, the most appropriate model would allow the
treatment of many interrelated variables with the aim of summarizing data
and highlighting possible latent factors. Our starting point lies in the Rasch
model (Rasch, 1980), a statistical model originally developed as a psychomet-
ric tool for the social sciences. This model has been applied in psychology, but
also medicine and education. Bacci (2012) and Bacci & Bartolucci (2012), for
example, apply it to the scoring of quality of life; Bacci & Caviezel (2011) use
it to score teaching evaluation. Recently the model also found applications
in organizational and management studies and specifically applied to finan-
cial issues (Soutar & Cronish-Ward, 1997), marketing and consumer behavior
(Fischer et al. , 2006; Salzberg & Sinkovics, 2006) and to tourism manage-
ment (Oreja-Rodriguez & Yanes-Estevez, 2007). Ferrari et al. (2005) explore
its validity and constraints as a tool to quantify the vulnerability of degree of
historical-architectonical buildings in Northern Italy. Murray & Mills (2012)
applies as similar methodology to the scoring of energy insecurity in the United
States.
The traditional Rasch model, developed for dichotomous data, is based on
the assumption that the object of the study is a latent variable in which two
diﬀerent entities interact: the subjects under consideration and the diﬀerent
“items” which are observed for each of the subjects. In this framework, the
probability of observing a given item (or positive response) for any given indi-
vidual is a decreasing function of item diﬃculty/complexity and an increasing
function of the subject latent trait, or “ability”. Unlike other aggregation tech-
niques, this model scores each country and each of the policy instruments under
consideration along a continuum. The basic Rasch model was subsequently
enriched to allow handling ordinal observations, as in our case, and is gener-
ally classified within the framework of Item Response Models. An additional
complication in our case is the fact that we have information on each pol-
icy instrument for each of the countries under consideration in a longitudinal
framework.
To accomodate the structure of our data, we set up a three-level random
intercept ordinal logistic model for adjacent categories where policy i (one of
the five categories described above) is the first level observation, measurement
t (the time period in which responses to each policy are observed) is the second
level observation and country j is the third level unit.
In our framework, countries are the observed subjects which are charac-
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terised by a score on an ordinal scale for each of the diﬀerent policy instruments
considered (items). According to Bacci & Caviezel (2011) this model can be
written as a multilevel Partial Credit Model (PCM) as follows:
P (Yitj = m|✓0tj , ✓00j) = exp [
Pm
k=0(✓0tj + ✓00j   ( i + ⌧ik))]
1 +
PM 1
l=1 exp
hPl
k=0(✓0tj + ✓00j   ( i + ⌧ik
⌘
)]
(1)
where Yitj is the level of policy i (i = 1, . . . , I) in time t (t = 1,...,T)
for country j (j = 1, . . . , n). The parameter  i, which in the traditional
model indicates the average diﬃculty of the ith item, is now associated with
the average diﬃculty of the ith policy instrument. The parameter ⌧ik indicates
the diﬀerent threshold in the categories. A threshold is intended as the point
in which two adjacent categories have the same probability to be chosen. In
PCM the distance between thresholds for an item can diﬀers and moreover the
thresholds can diﬀer freely from one item to another (Masters, 1982). More
simple Rasch polytomous models exists in which threshold values for all the
items are assumed to be equal even if the distance between thresholds can
diﬀer (Andrich, 1978). In our context, however, a PCM is more coherent,
since the diﬃculty levels can be assumed to diﬀer between policies and the
country should then receive a partial credit (score for each policy) equivalent
to the relative level of diﬃculty of the performance achieved.
The main diﬀerence between this formulation and the“traditional” PCM lies
in the fact that we account for two levels of clustering of the data, namely time
and country, rather than only one. Hence, the presence of two new random
eﬀects ✓0tj and ✓00j, instead of the traditional subject (country) random eﬀect
✓j indicating the level of the latent trait for the jth country. In this framework,
the second level residuals ✓0tj indicate the deviation of the latent variable ✓ (i.e.
the composite indicator) for year t and country j from the average value of
country j: accordingly, they allow for an analysis of time within each country.
On the other hand, third-level residuals ✓00j indicate the deviation of the latent
variable for county j from the average value of the population. ✓0tj and ✓00j are
independent and normally distributed with mean zero and constant variances.
They are obtained as the expected a posteriori (empirical) Bayes predictions,
namely the posterior distributions of the parameters given the policy responses.
In addition, the threshold parameters can be used to characterize the level of
complexity/diﬃculty of the policy portfolio implemented in each year.
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The aim of this study is to construct a composite indicator that allows
ranking counties over time with respect to their ability to implement environ-
mental and energy policies. We construct a time-varying indicator as a sum
of random eﬀects ✓0tj and ✓00j:
CIjt = ✓0tj + ✓00j (2)
where CIjt is the time-varying composite indicator of ability to implement
environmental and energy policies in country j and time t. The indicator
provides continuum of environmental and energy policy ratings and enable to
assess and rank countries according to their ability across countries and over
time. Standard error of the indicator is derived as follows:
SECIjt =
q
V AR✓0tj + V AR✓00j (3)
The outcomes of our statistical framework are thus (1) threshold param-
eters measuring the intrinsic diﬃculty/probability of observing a given cat-
egorical response for each item/policy instrument; (2) time-country specific
intercepts for each country over time and (3) country-specific mean param-
eters (4) time-specific country indicator which allow for an overall country
ranking in each year over the sample period. (2) - (4) are derived conditional
on the policy instrument diﬃculty levels.
However, the ability of each country to implement energy eﬃciency policy
can be thought of as the combination of two diﬀerent eﬀects. On the one hand,
some institutional and economic characteristics are likely to aﬀect each coun-
try’s ability to pursue eﬃciency improvements. For example, richer countries
might have more room to phase out old capital equipment. Second, condi-
tional on these observable characteristics some countries might be truly more
commitment to eﬃciency than others.
The ranking emerging from a descriptive model like the one described so
far does not discriminate between these two diﬀerent eﬀects. Germany, for
example, ranks highest but this could be the result of either better starting
conditions or of a true commitment to higher energy eﬃciency than other
countries, or both. To tackle this issue, we combine the multilevel PCM with
a latent regression model which allows to explain the variation in the time
and country posterior Bayes estimates using a set of covariates. De Boeck
& Wilson (2004) refer to this as the latent regression Rasch model, namely a
subject explanatory model, which includes subject properties as explainatory
variables for the diﬀerences in between-subject scores.
Given our three level structure, we include a vector of covariates Xj for the
third-level residuals ✓00j for each country j
✓00j = Xj⇣ + "00j (4)
and a vector of covariates Ztj for the second level residuals ✓0tj for each year
t and for each country j
✓0tj = Ztj  + "0tj (5)
The new equation of the model is:
P (Yitj = m|✓0tj , ✓00j) = exp [
Pm
k=0(Xj⇣ + Ztj  + "0tj + "00j   ( i + ⌧ik))]
1 +
PM 1
l=1 exp
hPl
k=0(Xj⇣ + Ztj  + "0tj + "00j   ( i + ⌧ik
⌘
)]
(6)
The random eﬀects for the second and third level are independent and nor-
mally distributed with mean zero and constant variances. They are obtained
as the expected a posteriori (empirical) Bayes predictions are the residual
components "0tj and "00j. These residuals are cleaned from the “comparative
advantage” eﬀect due to the eﬀect of clear observables. They can be therefore
be interpreted as measures of commitment to eﬃciency policy. Similarly to
the descriptive model, to analyse and rank countries in terms of commitment
to eﬃciency policy over time we build a time-varying indicator for each coun-
try as the sum of two residual components "0tj and "00j(standard errors are
obtained similar to equation 2).
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4 Results
4.1 Multilevel Partial Credit Model
The multilevel PCM model with and without latent regression on the sub-
ject parameters is estimated using the GLLAMM routine in STATA (Bacci &
Caviezel, 2011).
We adjusted original scale of policy variables according to the model re-
quirements. The PCM diﬀers from other statistical models in that it has strict
requirement on the data. PCM is valid for measurement only if the data fits
the model. In our context, the model requires that a country having a greater
ability should have the greater probability of having higher weighted policy
value. The model also requires frequently populated response categories and
no gap in ordinal response. 6 Original dataset shows many categories with low
frequencies. Therefore, we collapse categories into adjacent ones, for those vari-
ables with disordered average measures or similar category thresholds. This
assures average measures to increase monotonically and a proper separation
of thresholds for all the variables. The number of categories varies for each
policy instrument and is presented in Table 1. Figure 1 provides an overview
of the data by type of instrument and country.
The multilevel PCM results in estimates for each of the parameter thresh-
olds which are reported in Table 2. The assumptions of thresholds diﬀering
by policy instrument is confirmed by the empirical findings. The estimated
thresholds for the diﬀerent policy instruments are generally significant, with
the exceptions of two thresholds associated with financial instruments. In this
case the model suggests that there is big diﬀerence between having no financial
instrument and implementing at least one or more than three, namely a more
complex financial approach.
Conditional on the estimated item thresholds, the variance for the second
level (time) and third level (country) residuals (and associated standard errors
SE) are estimated at 9.46e-21 (SE: 1.953e-11) and 0.730 (SE: 0.22), respec-
tively. Both eﬀects are significant. Note however that the second level variance,
6Categories with low frequencies are problematic because they do not provide enough
observations for stable estimation of thresholds. Such infrequently endorsed categories often
indicate unnecessary or redundant categories. The same is valid also for variables with
category thresholds very close to each other. This suggests that each category corresponds
to only a narrow interval in that variable and categories collapsing is recommended Bond
& Fox (n.d.).
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Diﬃculty Thresholds Coeﬀ. SE p-value
Regulatory Policy - Threshold 1 0.47 0.22 0.03
Regulatory Policy - Threshold 2 1.87 0.31 0.00
Regulatory Policy - Threshold 3 1.89 0.21 0.00
Voluntary Measures - Threshold 1 0.51 0.23 0.03
Voluntary Measures - Threshold 2 0.71 0.29 0.00
Voluntary Measures - Threshold 3 0.87 0.35 0.01
Voluntary Measures - Threshold 4 0.92 0.28 0.01
Financial Instruments -Threshold 1 -0.73 0.26 0.00
Financial Instruments -Threshold 2 0.35 0.26 0.19
Financial Instruments -Threshold 3 0.57 0.28 0.53
Financial Instruments -Threshold 4 0.84 0.30 0.00
Financial Instruments -Threshold 5 0.90 0.25 0.00
Fiscal/Tax Reductions - Threshold 1 1.29 0.23 0.00
Fiscal/Tax Reductions - Threshold 2 2.43 0.41 0.00
Information/Education - Threshold 1 0.43 0.23 0.07
Information/Education - Threshold 2 0.57 0.27 0.03
Information/Education - Threshold 3 1.10 0.33 0.00
Information/Education -Threshold 4 1.15 0.29 0.00
Energy tax - Threshold 1 0.43 0.23 0.07
Energy tax - Threshold 2 0.57 0.27 0.03
Energy tax - Threshold 3 0.82 0.33 0.00
Energy tax - Threshold 4 0.93 0.23 0.00
Variances and covariances of random eﬀects
Second Level Variance (Time) 9.46e-21 1.953e-11 0.00
Second Level Variance (Country) 0.73 0.22 0.00
Table 2: Item/policy thresholds
which indicates deviations over time of each country’s aggregate score from its
own mean, is extremely low in absolute value, while the third level variance,
indicating the variation of country scores from the overall mean, is higher in
absolute value. Between country variation over our sample period in much
higher than within country variation over time.
Given the estimated variance of the second and third level, we can obtain
the latent traits as the posterior Bayes estimates from the model.
Figure 2 presents country ranking by derived indicators and confidence
intervals for the estimates in the first (2004) and the last (2009) year of the
sample period.
The ranking emerging from the multilevel PCM indicates that, conditional
on the diﬃculty of the chosen policy portfolio, Germany, Netherlands and the
UK are the proved to be the leaders in terms of energy policy implementation
16
Figure 2: Rank of estimated indicator for multilevel PCM model, years 2004
and 2009
in Europe. At the low end of the rankings are Latvia and Poland. Note
that in Figure 2 confidence intervals for the diﬀerent countries in our sample
greatly overlap, indicating that the performance of diﬀerent EU countries is
not strikingly diﬀerent. Exceptions are countries in the top and the bottom of
the ranking, whose confidence intervals does not overlap with that of most of
the other countries.
4.2 Explanatory Multilevel Partial Credit Model
In the previous section, we present results on the latent trait and time pro-
file of countries’ performances based on a PCM. However, these latent traits
(and hence the ranking emerging from Figure 2) are likely aﬀected from the
presence of certain observable country characteristics. The fact that Germany,
Netherlands and the UK score best in the sample might be the results of a true
higher commitment and eﬀort to tackle energy eﬃciency in these countries, or
simply the result of the fact that these countries are among the richest in the
17
sample.
A number of observable characteristics are likely to aﬀect each country’s
rank in Figure 3. First of all, the likelihood of targeting eﬃciency in industrial
sector will depend on the weight of this sector within each economy. Our
expectation in this respect is that the higher the share of GDP accounted for
by manufacturing, the higher the commitment to fostering energy eﬃciency.
On one hand, the potential savings from increased energy eﬃciency would
be high. On the other, industry lobbies are likely to pressure governments
to establish support measures such as fiscal incentives to lower the costs of
energy inputs. Second, countries with higher levels of eﬃciency might have
already reaped the low hanging fruits, and either not feel the need to address
the issue of energy eﬃciency through regulation or find it harder to implement
higher costs options. Third, the level of dependence of a given country from
energy inputs is also a factor likely to aﬀect its propensity to tackle energy
eﬃciency as a way to achieve energy security. Finally, the availability of energy
eﬃcient technologies within any given economy will increase the likelihood that
pro-eﬃciency regulation is passed given that a certain degree of improvement
should in theory be easily reached.
We thus extend the model, as explained in the previous Section, to condi-
tion each of the estimated latent traits on these observables. Specifically, we
select the share of manufacturing in GDP (WDI, 2013), the level of energy eﬃ-
ciency (WDI, 2013), the share of energy imports (WDI, 2013) and the number
of energy eﬃciency patent applications to the EPO by applicants in a given
country (OECD, 2013). Descriptive statistics of these variables by country and
for the overall sample are displayed in Table 2. All these variables vary greatly
between countries, with the exception of the share of manufacturing in GDP,
which exhibits low within country variation. For this reason, we include lagged
values of energy eﬃciency, share of energy imports and eﬃciency patents as
time-varying country-level regressors. The share of manufacturing in GDP is
instead included as a country-varying regressor to explain third level (between
countries) variation.
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The results on covariates coeﬃcients emerging from the explanatory model
are presented in Table 4:
Variable Coeﬀ. SE t
Covariates of Second Level Random Eﬀect (Time)
Energy Eﬃcient Patent Applications to EPO, (t-1) 0.003 0.001 3.00
Energy Intensity, (t-1) -0.004 0.001 4.00
Fuel Imports, % of Merchandise Imports (t-1) 0.046 0.012 3.83
Covariates of Third level random eﬀects (Country)
Manufacturing in Value Added, % of GDP (mean) 0.085 0.033 2.57
Table 4: Results on Second and Third Level Covariates
Conditioning the country-level random eﬀect on these observed covariates,
the ranking of countries changes as presented in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Rank of estimated indicator for PCM explanatory model, years 2004
and 2009
Specifically, controlling for the observable covariates improves the rank-
ing position of those countries which previously scored low due to the fact
that the manufacturing sector accounts for a smaller share of the economy,
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that they are already energy eﬃcient and have reaped the least cost options,
whose availability of new eﬃcient technologies is lower and dependence from
foreign energy imports is higher. For example, Eastern European countries
such as Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania improve their ranking, because given
the inhibiting observable characteristics of their economy, the level of energy
eﬃciency regulatory they put in place is higher than average.
5 Conclusion
This paper presented a novel approach to assessing and comparing countries’
energy eﬃciency or environmental policy portfolios and performance. This
method, inspired by the literature on multilevel latent models and Item Re-
sponse Theory (IRT), results in a ranking of European countries which ac-
counts for the inherent diﬃculty of a given policy instrument mix. Moreover,
the model is extended to deal with the longitudinal data and to adjust the
ranking as a result of country-specific economic and institutional observables
which are likely to aﬀect the likelihood of regulating energy eﬃciency.
We believe this approach is a promising one in assessing countries’ commit-
ment to environmental and energy policy since it is able to overcome a number
of shortcomings of the previous literature on policy indicators. First, while the
basic approach we propose has been applied in the statistical literature of scor-
ing, its application to the context of environmental policy is novel. Second,
we extend the basic IRT model to a multilevel framework which is consistent
with the nature of the policy data available. Third, using the weighted count
of policies which are implemented in each country in any given year and ef-
fective energy tax rate, our ranking informs about the general commitment of
a given country, as well as shed the light on the actual level of stringency of
the given policy. Fourth, our approach allows to attribute diﬀerent weights or
diﬃculty levels to the diﬀerent policy instruments included in the policy port-
folio. Thus, our assessment is conditional on the specific complexity of each
country’s policy portfolio. Fifth, we combine the multilevel IRT model with
a latent regression, thereby allowing each country scores to be conditioned on
observed country’s characteristics.
We apply this methodology to data on eﬃciency policy targeting indus-
trial sectors in 27 EU countries in the years 2004-2009. Our results show that
accounting for economic and institutional characteristics changes the ranking
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of countries with respect to energy eﬃcient policy. Specifically, the position
of those countries with worse “initial conditions” but which choose to regulate
energy eﬃciency nonetheless, demonstrating a higher than average commit-
ment.
We believe our methodology is a step in the right direction of creating an
index of policy commitment and stringency. It applications to other datasets
could easily generate similar results. The model presented in this paper can be
fruitfully extended to account for the presence of random slopes (as opposed
to only random intercepts) and to better study the eﬀect of time. To this end,
focusing on a wider sample of countries would be beneficial, since variation
in policy responses of the EU member states is necessarily limited given the
common framework under which these policies are developed. Our current
research is moving in this direction.
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